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ARTICLES
REGULATORY ROOMS IN AUSTRALIAN
CORPORATE LAW*
Joanna Bird*
Jennifer Hill*
I. INTRODUCTION
Regulation, it has been said, occurs "in many rooms."1
According to some political commentators, there is an interna-
tional trend in advanced liberal governments to govern, not
directly, but rather through the decisions of autonomous
agents.2 This trend blurs the traditional distinction in regula-
tion between government and citizen. It also recognizes the
complexities of modern life, in which "market, civil society, citi-
zens... have their own internal logics and densities, their
own intrinsic mechanisms of self-regulation."3 The trend as-
t An earlier version of this article was presented at the XV Congress of the
International Academy of Comparative Law, Bristol, England (1998). Our thanks to
Robert Apps, Stamatina Sismanis and Mehera San Roque for their research assis-
tance. Financial assistance for this project was provided by the Australian Re-
search Council.
University of Sydney Law School.
'* University of Sydney Law School; Corporate Counsel, Corrs Chambers
Westgarth; Visiting Professor, University of Virginia and University of Texas at
Austin (1998-1999).
1. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRAN-
SCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 3 (1992) (citing Marc Galanter, Justice in
Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURAL-
ISM 1 (1981)).
2. See, e.g., Nikolas Rose, Government, Authority and Expertise in Advanced
Liberalism, 22 ECON. & SOC'Y 283, 298 (1993); Patricia Ewick, Corporate Cures:
The Commodification of Social Control, 13 STUD. L. POL. & SOC'Y 137, 138-39
(1993); Graham Burchell, Liberal Government and Technique of the Self, 22 ECON.
& SocY' 267, 276 (1993).
3. Rose, supra note 2, at 289. See also Julia Black, Constitutionalising Self-
Regulation, 59 MOD. L. REV. 24 (1996); Robert J. Bush, Comment, Stimulating
Corporate Self-Regulation-The Corporate Self-Evaluative Privilege: Paradigmatic
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sumes that interconnected and overlapping systems of regula-
lion can be more effective than any single technique.
The message of these political commentators has particu-
lar resonance in the arena of Australian corporate law. There
has been a well-publicized retreat from direct regulation by the
government under Australia's Corporate Law Economic Reform
Program (CLERP). This retreat, coupled with the hard lessons
of the 1980s for companies, investors and regulators alike,'
has coincided with the emergence of "corporate governance" as
a fin de si~cle buzz-word.
Although there are a number of definitions of the term
"corporate governance," most refer to the systems by which
companies are organized, directed and controlled.' Corporate
governance is therefore essentially about accountability' and
legitimacy.7 Although the central focus in a number of interna-
tional reports on corporate governance tends to be the role and
responsibility of managers and directors,8 it also necessarily
involves questions as to the roles of other groups within the
Preferentialism or Pragmatic Panacea, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 597 (1993).
4. The interrelation between government regulation and corporate governance
was recognized by Sir Adrian Cadbury, in arguing that inadequate enforcement of
good governance practices could lead to a renewal of onerous government regula-
tion. See John Holland, Self Regulation and the Financial Aspects of Corporate
Governance, 1996 J. BUS. L. 127, 131 n.12 (citing Adrian Cadbury, Reflections on
Corporate Governance, in THE CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF BANKERS (1993)). A num-
ber of Australian commentators note the causal connection between the "corporate
excesses of the 1980s" and the emergence of the corporate governance debate. See,
e.g., Angus Corbett, A Proposal for a More Responsive Approach to the Regulation
of Corporate Governance, 23 FED. L. REV. 277 (1995); Peter Schelluch & Grant
Gay, Corporate Governance, 15 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 235 (1997).
5. See Ian M. Ramsay, The Corporate Governance Debate and the Role of
Directors' Duties, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE DUTIES OF COMPANY DIREC-
TORS 2-3 (Ian M. Ramsay ed., 1997); Stephen Bottomley, From Contractualism to
Constitutionalism: A Framework for Corporate Governance, 19 SYDNEY L. REV. 277
(1997); Corbett, supra note 4; MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RE-
THINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3-4 (1995);
Holland, supra note 4, at 128-29.
6. See SALEEM SHEIKH & WILLIAM REES, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & CORPO-
RATE CONTROL v (1995); D.D. Prentice, Some Aspects of the Corporate Governance
Debate, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 25 (D.D. Prentice &
P.R.J. Holland eds., 1993).
7. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Comparative Aspects of Institutional Investment
and Corporate Governance, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVER-
NANCE 4-5 (Theodor Baums et al. eds., 1994).
8. See Len Sealy, Corporate Governance and Directors' Duties, 1 N.Z. BUS. L.
Q. 92 (1995).
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corporate enterprise, as a check on managerial power.
The central goal of this article is to examine some of the
rooms of regulation in current Australian corporate law, which
determine the systems by which Australian companies are
organized, directed and controlled today. These regulatory
mechanisms include familiar legal duties, such as directors'
fiduciary obligations and their enforcement, outlined in Sec-
tions Three, Four and Five. The legislative response to uncer-
tainty created by recent judicial decisions is embodied in the
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Bill9 (CLERP Bill),
which is examined in Section Six.
In recent times, the scope of fiduciary and other duties has
potentially been extended by important developments in the
area of shadow director liability, to encompass a range of third
parties closely associated with the corporation. These develop-
ments, and their potential impact, are explored in Section
Seven.
Contemporary rooms of regulation also include greater
involvement in governance by shareholders, discussed in Sec-
tion Eight, and commercial organizations, discussed in Section
Nine. This involvement includes guidelines emanating from
the Investment and Financial Services Association (IFSA) °
and the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), discussed in Section
Ten, as well as informal pressure and monitoring through
institutional investor activism. A number of corporate gover-
nance practices concerning the structure of boards and disclo-
sure are derived from these sources." The Australian Corpo-
rations Law12 (Corporations Law) and the Australian Stock
Exchange Listing Rules" also use shareholder consent as a
regulatory technique for a range of corporate transactions.'4
Reforms to the law relating to company meetings under the
9. Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Bill, 1998, (Austl.) [hereinafter
CLERP Bill].
10. This association was previously named the Australian Investment
Managers' Association (AIMA).
11. See, e.g., IFSA Guidance Note No. 2.00, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A GUIDE
FOR INVESTMENT MANAGERS AND CORPORATIONS (1999).
12. Corporations Law, (Austl.).
13. Guide to Listing on ASX, § 4 (visited Sept. 26, 1999)
<http-twww.asx.com.auHISB1500.htm> [hereinafter ASX Listing Rules].
14. See COMPANIES AND SECURITIES ADVISORY COMM1ITTEE, SHAREHOLDER PAR-
TICIPATION IN THE MODERN LISTED COMPANY, DISCUSSION PAPER 8 n.7 (1999).
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recently enacted Company Law Review Act 5 may also facili-
tate greater shareholder involvement in governance issues.
Finally, Section Eleven addresses the significant develop-
ments in the area of market-based regulation and commercial
practice. Proposed changes to Australia's takeover regime un-
der the CLERP Bill, for example, are designed to reactivate
takeovers as a disciplinary technique for under-performing
corporate managers.16 Section Eleven also examines a com-
mercial development designed to ensure managerial account-
ability to shareholders, namely, the rise of performance-based
remuneration for executives and directors.
II. WHO IS GOVERNING AUSTRALIAN COmPANIES AND How ARE
THEY DOING IT?
A recent report by Korn/Ferry International 7 gives a
snapshot of board composition and governance structures today
in Australasia."8 Significant aspects of the profile of boards
are as follows:
-Boards of public companies typically comprise eight direc-
tors, including two executive and six non-executive. Boards of
private companies are generally smaller (six directors), with
equal numbers of executive and non-executive directors, and
government boards have only one executive director. Austra-
lian boards tend to be smaller than their counterparts in the
U.S. 19
-Over 55% of Australian directors are aged between 51 and
55 and the median age of executive directors is five years less
than that of non-executive directors. 0
15. Company Law Review Act, 1998, ch. 2G (Austl.).
16. See CLERP, COMMENTARY ON DRAFT PROvISIONS 93 (1998).
17. KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, BOARDS OF DmEcTORs IN AUSTRALIA AND
NEW ZEALAND 1998 (1998) [hereinafter KORN/FERRY].
18. The Korn/Ferry survey covered 172 organizations in Australia and New
Zealand, including over 35 companies with assets in excess of $1.5 billion. See id.
at 4.
19. Id at 6. In contrast to Australian boards, U.S. boards typically are com-
prised of eleven directors, including two executive and nine outside directors. Even
this figure represents a shift in the U.S. towards "smaller, more independent and
more accountable boards." See Korn/Ferry's New Study Tracks 25 Years of Change
in America's Corporate Boardrooms, BUS. WIRE, Sept. 24, 1998.
20. KORN/FERRY, supra note 17, at 7.
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0 Of non-executive directors surveyed in Australia, 15% were
current CEOs of other companies, 22% were retired CEOs of
other companies and 2% were retired CEOs of the company
on whose board they sat. Multiple directorships were held by
46%. The dominant professional backgrounds of non-execu-
tive directors were: accounting (17%), commercial banking
(11%), legal (9%) and agri-business (8%).21
*Women comprised 9.7% of non-executive directors in Austra-
lian companies surveyed, and 1.3% of executive directorsY.
*In contrast to corporate practice in the U.S., Australian
governance best practice clearly separates the roles of CEO
and chairperson of the board, to provide structural checks
and balances to the CEO's powers. Of all companies sur-
veyed, 92% separated these roles.s
-There is an entrenched committee structure in Australia,
with 85% of companies, and all listed public companies, sur-
veyed operating through a range of committees. These includ-
ed audit committees (85% of all companies surveyed and 99%
of public listed companies), compensation committees (56% of
all companies surveyed), nomination committees (22% of all
companies surveyed), compliance committees (16% of all
companies surveyed) and risk management committees (13%
of all companies surveyed).'
*The main mechanisms for appointing the CEO in Australian
21. Id. at 8. It has been said that, for historical and cultural reasons,
"Australia's leading companies operate under a tangle of cross-directorships," with
twenty-two directors serving on the boards of three or more of Australia's top 50
companies. Andrew Cornell, The Cabal That Runs Australia's Companies, AUSTL.
FIN. REV., June 6, 1998, at 21. See Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corpora-
tions and Securities, Report on the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Bill
1998 (May 1999), para. 2.4 (expressing concern about the concentration of director-
ships in Australia and adopting the view that the increase in levels of share own-
ership in Australia should be matched by an expansion in the pool from which
company directors can be chosen).
22. KORNIFERRY, supra note 17, at 9.
23. Id. at 6. Only 6% of U.S. companies surveyed in 1997 had an independent
non-executive chairperson. See id. See also KornlFerry's New Study Tracks 25
Years of Change in America's Corporate Boardrooms, supra note 19.
24. KORN/FERRY, supra note 17, at 18-20.
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companies were internal appointment (46%) and executive
search (35%). Shareholder nomination led to 10% of CEO
appointments. On the other hand, recommendation by major
shareholders was an important source of new non-executive
directors, accounting for 29% of appointments.2
*The report found that there is regular formal and informal
contact with institutional investors at both board and execu-
tive level in Australasian public companies.26
• Sixty percent of companies surveyed had a code of ethics,
with formal written codes being more common in publicly
listed companies2
H. DIRECTORS' DUTIES IN AuSmAL-A REGULATORY MAP
Australian directors are subject to a multitude of overlap-
ping duties. The case law requires that directors avoid conflicts
of interest, not fetter their discretion, act with due care, and
exercise their powers in good faith for the benefit of the compa-
ny and for a proper purpose.' These broad common law du-
ties are to a large extent duplicated by statutory duties. The
Corporations Law prohibits improper use of information' and
position.0 These two conflict avoidance duties are supple-
mented by provisions preventing directors of public companies
voting on, or being present for discussion of, any matter in
which they have a material personal interest3' and requiring
directors of proprietary companies to declare their conflicts of
interest to fellow board members.12 In addition, there is a com-
plex statutory regime prohibiting related party transactions.33
25. Id. at 11, 15.
26. Id. at 21-22.
27. Id. at 21.
28. See FORD ET AL., FORD's PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATIONS LAW para. 8.010
(1999).
29. Corporations Law, § 232(5) (Austl.). Note that if the CLERP Bill is enact-
ed, many of the legislative provisions referred to in section HI will be renumbered
and rewritten. Their substantive effect will not be greatly altered.
30. Id. § 232(6).
31. See id. § 232A_
32. See id. § 231.
33. See id. at ch. 2E.
560 [Vol. XXV:3
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The case law duty of care is replicated by a statutory duty to
exercise "care and diligence"' and the statutory duty to "act
honestly"35 has been interpreted as a legislative enactment of
the duty to act in good faith for the benefit of the company and
for a proper purpose.36 Finally, the Corporations Law imposes
a number of more specific duties on directors. These include
duties in relation to corporate accounts 7 and insolvent trad-
ing.3
8
Of this panoply of duties, it is the duty of care that, in
recent years, has been most controversial, attracting attention
from the legislature, the courts, academics, legal practitioners
and directors. The article, therefore, focuses on this duty.
IV. HISTORY OF THE DUTY OF CARE (OR How Low CAN You
Go?)
Until the early 1990s there were, in fact, very few Austra-
lian cases dealing with the duty of care. Possibly this was
because the standard of care required of directors was both
settled and extraordinarily undemanding. The English cases of
the late 19th and early 20th century held that directors were
liable for "gross negligence" only" and this standard was
adopted in Australian law. The judgment of Romer J. in the
key English case of In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co.4"
was treated as the definitive exposition of the duty of care
34. Id. § 232(4).
35. Id. § 232(2).
36. There has been debate as to whether the statutory duty is an exact dupli-
cation of the case law duty to act in good faith for the benefit of the company
and for a proper purpose. In particular, there is uncertainty as to whether section
232(2) of the Corporations Law, like the case law duty, prohibits an exercise of
power which the director, subjectively, thinks is in the interests of the company
but which is nonetheless for an improper purpose. See Marchesi v. Barnes [1970]
V.R. 434; Australian Growth Resources Corp. Pty v. Van Reesema (1988) 13
A.C.L.R. 261. As part of the CLERP reforms, section 232(2) will be amended so
that it clearly mirrors the case law duty. See CLERP Bill, supra note 9, § 181,
sched. 1.
37. See Corporations Law, § 344 (Austl.).
38. See id. § 588G.
39. See Overend & Gurney Co. v. Gibb 5 L.R.-E. & I. App. 480, 486-87 (1872)
(Eng.); Lagunas Nitrate Co. v. Lagunas Syndicate 2 L.R.-Ch. 392, 418 (1899)
(Eng.); In re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates, Ltd. 1 L.R.-Ch. 425, 436
(1911) (Eng.); In re City Equitable Fire Ins. Co. 1 L.R.-Ch. 407, 427 (1925) (Eng.).
40. 1 L.R.-Ch. 407 (1925) (Eng.).
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imposed on Australian directors.4 In that case Romer J. held
that a director is required to exercise "the care an ordinary
man might be expected to take in the circumstances on his
own behalf."42 Even this statement of the duty was immedi-
ately undermined by Romer J.'s approval of the proposition
that directors are liable only if they "were cognisant of circim-
stances of such a character, so plain, so manifest, and so sim-
ple of appreciation, that no men with any ordinary degree of
prudence, acting on their own behalf, would have entered into
such a transaction as they entered into."3 Romer J.'s further
elucidation of the duty confirmed that minimal care, skill and
diligence were expected of directors and that the courts would
tolerate substantial delegation by directors of their duties."
The first judicial indication that more would be expected of
directors came a decade ago in the context of insolvent trading
cases. In Statewide Tobacco Services, Ltd. v. Morley" and
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v. Friedrich6 the court as-
serted that changes to the corporations legislation and increas-
ing community expectations showed that more was now re-
quired of directors.47 Whilst Ormiston J. acknowledged that
"there is still a place for part-time and advisory directors,"48
both he and Tadgell J. insisted the law would no longer toler-
ate the passive or incompetent director.49 Their judgments es-
41. See Douglas Menzies, Company Directors, 33 AUSTL. L.J. 156, 163 (1959).
42. 1 L.R.-Ch. 407, 428 (1925) (Eng.).
43. Id. (quoting Overend & Gurney Co. v. Gibb (1872) 5 L.R.-E. & I. App.
480, 487 (Eng.)).
44. Id. at 428-29. Romer J. said:
(1) A director need not exhibit in the performance of his duties a greater
degree of skill than may reasonably be expected from a person of his
knowledge and experience. . . . (2) A director is not bound to give con-
tinuous attention to the affairs of his company. ... (3) In respect of all
duties that, having regard to the exigencies of business, and the articles
of association, may properly be left to some other official, a director is, in
the absence of grounds for suspicion, justified in trusting that official to
- perform such duties honestly.
Id.
45. (1990) 2 A.C.S.R. 405 (affd by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of
Victoria in Morley v. Statewide Tobacco Serv., Ltd. (1992) 8 A.C.S.R. 305).
46. (1991) 5 A.C.S.R. 115.
47. See Statewide Tobacco v. Morley (1990) 2 A.C.S.R. 405, 412-13; Common-
wealth Bank v. Friedrich (1991) 5 A.C.S.R. 115, 126. See also Morley v. Statewide
Tobacco (1992) 8 A.C.S.R. 305, 320; Metal Mfrs. Pty, Ltd. v. Lewis (1988) 13
N.S.W.L.R. 315, 318-19.
48. Statewide Tobacco v. Morley (1990) 2 A.C.S.R. 405, 431.
49. See id at 412-13; Commonwealth Bank v. Friedrich (1991) 5 A.C.S.R. 115,
562 [Vol. XXV:3
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tablished that directors must display a level of financial com-
petence and knowledge of the company's affairs sufficient to
enable them to reach an informed opinion as to the company's
financial capacity."
These cases were followed by a spate of litigation against
directors alleging that they had breached their duty of care.51
In a number of these cases the courts stated, frequently by
reference to the insolvent trading cases, that the standard of
care expected of directors had risen since the cases decided in
the late 19th and early 20th century. 2 Nevertheless, most
judgments, especially those from the Western Australian Su-
preme Court dealing with the aftermath of the notorious corpo-
rate collapses of the late 1980s, continued to rely heavily on In
re City Equitable and other English cases of that era.5" There
is little in these judgments, and that of Rogers C.J. in the key
New South Wales case of AWA v. Daniels,' which should
strike fear into the hearts of directors. In fact, whilst during
this period there was a significant number of civil and criminal
actions, it is difficult to find a case in which judgment was
entered against a director, who was not also tainted by breach-
es of other duties." However, AWA v. Daniels was widely ac-
126.
50. See Statewide Tobacco v. Morley (1990) 2 A.C.S.R. 405, 412-13; Common-
wealth Bank v. Friedrich (1991) 5 A.C.S.R. 115, 126.
51. See, e.g., AWA, Ltd. v. Daniels (1992) 7 A.C.S.R. 759; Cummings v.
Claremont Petroleum NL (1992) 9 A-C.S.R. 583; Austl. Sec. Comm'n v. Gallagher
(1993) 10 A.C.S.R. 43; Vrisakis v. Aust. Sec. Comm'n (1993) 9 W.A.R. 395;
McQuestin v. Austl. Sec. Comm'n (1993) 12 A.C.S.R. 279; Biala Pty, Ltd. v.
Mallina Holdings, Ltd. (1993) 11 A-C.S.R. 785; Permanent Bldg. Soc'y (in liq) v.
Wheeler (1994) 14 A.C.S.R. 109; NCSC v. Hurley (1995) 13 A.C.L.C. 1635; Daniels
v. Anderson (1995) 16 A.C.S.P 607 [hereinafter AWA Appeal]; In re Property Force
Consultants Pty, Ltd. (1995) 13 A.C.L.C. 1051; S. Austl. v. Marcus Clark (1996) 19
A.C.S.R. 606; Mistmorn Pty, Ltd. v. Yasseen (1996) 21 ANC.S.R. 173; Gamble v.
Hoffmann (1997) 24 A-C.S.R. 369; Aust. Sec. Comnm'n v. Donovan (1998) 28
A.C.S.R. 583.
52. See AWA v. Daniels (1992) 7 A.C.S.R. 759, 864-65; Vrisakis v. ASC (1993)
9 W.A.R. 395, 405; AWA Appeal, (1995) 16 A.C.S.R. 607, 661-64; S. Austl. v.
Marcus Clark (1996) 19 A.C.S.R. 606, 627-28.
53. 1 L.R.-Ch. 407 (1925) (Eng.). See Vrisakis v. Austl. Sec. Comm'n (1993) 9
WA. 395; Austl. Sec. Comm'n v. Gallagher (1993) 10 A.C.S.R. 43; Permanent
Bldg. Soc'y v. Wheeler (1994) 14 AKC.S.R. 109; NCSC v. Hurley (1995) 13 A.C.L.C.
1635.
54. (1992) 7 A.C.S.R. 759.
55. There are some cases in which judgment was entered against a director
for breach of the duty of care but in most of these the director was also in a
position of conflict or had breached other duties. See, e.g., Cummings v. Claremont
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knowledged as laying down a commercially realistic duty of
care. 6 The commercial acceptance of the judicial interpreta-
tion of the duty evaporated when the Court of Appeal delivered
its judgment in the appeal from AWA v. Daniels." In some
quarters, at least, this judgment was criticized as imposing too
onerous and unrealistic a duty on directors.8
The statutory expression of the duty of care was also
amended in the early 1990s. Although the Explanatory Memo-
randum asserts that the amended section does no more than
re-state the case law duty of care, 9 it is clear that the impe-
tus for the amendment was a perception that, prior to the
1990s, the duty of care required of directors was unacceptably
low. 0 However, by the time the legislation was introduced
into Parliament, cases such as Commonwealth Bank of Austra-
lia v. Friedrich6 and AWA v. Daniels, enabled the govern-
ment to claim that the amendment did "not change the law." "
It is against this case law and legislative background that
the current Federal Government has proposed a number of
reforms to the duty of care as part of CLERP. In particular, it
proposes the introduction of a statutory business judgment
rule, explicit recognition of a director's right to delegate to and
rely on others, and further amendment of the statutory duty of
Petroleum (1992) 9 A.C.S.R. 583; S. Austl. v. Marcus Clark (1996) 19 A.C.S.R. 606;
Mistmorn v. Yasseen (1996) 21 A.C.S.R. 173; Gamble v. Hoffmann (1997) 24
A.C.S.R. 369. In other cases in which the court held that a director had breached
the duty of care, no judgment was entered against the director. See, e.g., Perma-
nent Bldg. Soc'y (in liq) v. Wheeler (1994) 14 A.C.S.R. 109; AWA Appeal (1995) 16
A.C.S.R, 607; McQuestin v. Austl. Sec. Comm'n (1993) 12 A.C.S.R. 279. In most
cases directors were exonerated.
56. See A.S. Sievers, Directors' Duty of Care: What is the New Standard?, 15
COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 392 (1997).
57. AWA Appeal (1995) 16 A.C.S.R. 607.
58. See Robert Baxt, One "AWA Case' is Not Enough: The Turning of the
Screws for Directors, 13 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 414 (1995); Australian Institute of
Company Directors, Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule: Submission to
Department of TreasuryICLERP, June 1997, at 2. CLERP appears to blame the
judgment for much of the uncertainty about the duty of care. See CLERP,
Directors' Duties and Corporate Governance: Proposals For Reform: Paper No. 3
(1997), at 22 [hereinafter CLERP Proposal].
59. Corporate Law Reform Bill 1992, Explanatory Memorandum, at 83 [herein-
after CLRB Explanatory Memo]
60. See Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, Re-
port on the Social and Fiduciary Duties and Obligations of Company Directors,
Nov. 1989, ch..3 [hereinafter Cooney Report].
61. (1991) 5 A.C.S.R. 115.
62. CLRB Explanatory Memo, supra note 59, para. 83.
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V. THE CURRENT DUTY OF CARE (OR DRAGGING DIRECTORS
INTO T.HE 20TH CENTURY)
A. An Objective Duty with Subjective Elements
The duty is generally considered to be an objective one.63
A director must exercise reasonable care or, to put it another
way, the director's conduct will be measured by reference to
the conduct of a reasonable person in the position of the direc-
tor. This, however, does not mean that the same standard of
care, skill and diligence will be expected of all directors. The
duty is objective and thus constant, but the conduct required to
satisfy the duty varies depending on a number of circumstanc-
es.' The courts do not treat directors as professionals who are
expected to meet a uniform standard of conduct. It has been
recognized repeatedly that the nature of companies, the role of
directors within those companies and the experience and skill
of persons who become directors may legitimately vary to such
an extent that it is impossible to lay down a uniform set of
norms by which to judge a director's behavior.' Thus, it is
accepted that when determining what constitutes reasonable
care the courts must take into account a number of features of
the particular fact situation before them. In this way the duty
sometimes appears to operate much like a subjective one,
which the incompetent who plays a minor role in the company
is less likely to breach than the highly skilled chief executive
officer.
63. See Austl. Sec. Corm'n v. Gallagher (1993) 10 AC.S.P 43, 53; Vrisalds v.
Austl. Sec. Comm'n (1993) 9 W.A.R. 395, 451; Permanent Bldg. Soc'y (in liq) v.
Wheeler (1994) 14 A.C.S.R. 109, 159; NCSC v. Hurley (1995) 13 A.C.L.C. 1635
1641; AWA Appeal (1995) 16 A.C.S.R. 607, 666. The statutory duty provides that:
In the exercise of his or her powers and the discharge of his or her
duties, an officer of a corporation must exercise the degree of care and
diligence that a reasonable person in a like position in a corporation
would exercise in the corporation's circumstances.
Corporations Law, § 232(4) (Austl.).
64. See Vrisalds v. Austl. Sec. Comm'n (1993) 9 W.AR. 395, 404, 451; AWA
Appeal (1995) 16 A.C.S.R. 607, 668.
65. In re City Equitable Fire Ins. Co. 1 L.R.-Ch. 407, 426 (1925) (Eng.); Com-
monwealth Bank of Australia v. Friedrich (1991) 5 A.C.S.R. 115, 125; AWA v.
Daniels (1992) 7 A.C.S.R. 759, 865; AWA Appeal (1995) 16 A.C.S.R. 607, 664, 668.
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B. Variation of the Standard of Conduct Required of Directors
When determining what conduct will satisfy the duty of
care, the courts regard a number of factors. In particular, the
court will consider: (1) the type of company and its particular
circumstances; (2) the distribution of functions within the cor-
poration; and (3) the personal traits or idiosyncrasies of the
director involved.' The relevance and scope of the first two
factors is uncontroversial. The third is more problematic.
As early as In re City Equitable it was recognized that the
tasks of directors depend on the nature of the business con-
ducted by the company and the size of that business.67 The
modern cases particularly stress the relevance of size.' They
acknowledge that in modem conglomerates it is impossible for
directors to have a detailed knowledge of the business and its
day-to-day concerns.69 Thus, the larger the corporation, the
less involvement in the affairs of the company that can be
demanded of directors and the more they are allowed to dele-
gate the types of tasks that would ordinarily be the province of
the board.7 ° The modern statutory requirement also qualifies
the duty by reference to the "corporation's circumstances" so as
to allow consideration of "the state of the corporation's finan-
cial affairs, the size and nature of the corporation, [and] the
urgency and magnitude of any problem."7 '
Provided that there are no limitations in the company's
constitution, the company has considerable freedom to divide
management functions, within the board and between the
board and management, in any way it considers appropriate. 2
The court takes into account the distribution adopted when
determining whether a director's conduct satisfies the duty of
care. 3 In AWA v. Daniels, Rogers C.J. drew a clear, and much
66. See discussion infra Part V.B.
67. 1 L.R.-Ch. 407, 426 (1925) (Eng.). See also AWA v. Daniels (1992) 7
A.C.S.R. 759, 864, 866; Vrisakis v. Austl. Sec. Comm'n (1993) 9 W-A.R. 395, 451.
68. See, e.g., AWA v. Daniels (1992) 7 A.C.S.R. 759, 865-66.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. CLRB Explanatory Memo, supra note 59, para. 86.
72. See AWA v. Daniels (1992) 7 A.C.S.R. 759, 865-68. However, it appears
that functions can no longer be divided in such a way as to give a director an
entirely passive role. All directors are now required to perform certain minimum
functions. See discussion infra note 90 and accompanying text.
73. See CLRB Explanatory Memo, supra note 59, para. 39, 85; In re City
Equitable Fire Ins. Co., 1 L.R.-Ch. 407, 426-27 (1925) (Eng.); AWA v. Daniels
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supported,74 distinction between the roles of executive and
non-executive directors, stating that the latter are expected
merely to guide and monitor the company and give intermit-
tent attention to its affairs.75 The majority in the AWA Appeal
appeared to cast doubt on the relevance of this distinction.76
However, it is likely that they merely wished to stress that all
directors, regardless of the division of functions within the
board, must perform certain minimum functions, and that it is
no longer acceptable for non-executive directors to be appointed
solely for "perceived commercial advantage such as attracting
customers or adding to the prestige and status of the compa-
ny."77 In any case, the importance of the division drawn by
Rogers C.J. in AWA v. Daniels has been endorsed by courts in
other Australian jurisdictions."
As stated above, the relevance of the directors' personal
traits or idiosyncrasies to the determination of what is re-
quired to satisfy the duty is problematic. It has frequently
been said that "[wihat constitutes proper performance of the
duties of a director of a particular company is considered to be
dependant ... upon the actual knowledge and experience of the
individual director."79 Moreover, it is clear that if a director
has particular expertise, skill or experience, he or she will be
expected to display it and, thus, a higher standard of care is
required of such a director."0
However, the issue of whether the standard can be adjust-
ed downwards by reference to a director's lack of expertise,
skills, experience or, even, intelligence is controversial. It is
(1992) 7 A.C.S.R. 759, 864; Aust!. Sec. Comm'n v. Gallagher (1993) 10 A.C.S.R. 43,
53; Vrisakis v. Austl. Sec. Comm'n (1993) 9 WAR. 395, 451.
74. See, e.g., Alex Chernov, The Role of Corporate Governance Practices in the
Development of Legal Principles Relating to Directors, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AND THE DUTIES OF COMPANY DIRECTORS, supra note 5, at 33, 37; Baxt, supra
note 58, at 421.
75. AWA v. Daniels (1992) 7 A.C.S.R. 759, 866-67.
76. AWA Appeal (1995) 16 A.C.S.R. 607, 664.
77. Id.
78. See Biala v. Mallina (1993) 11 A.C.S.R. 785, 857; Vrisakis v. Austl. Sec.
Comm'n (1993) 9 W.A.R. 395, 451-52.
79. AWA v. Daniels (1992) 7 A.C.S.R. 759, 864 (approved in Vrisakis v. Austl.
Sec. Comm'n (1993) 9 W.R. 395, 451). The CLRB Explanatory Memo, supra note
59, para. 39, 85, states that the phrase "in a like position" in § 232(4) enables the
court to take into account the director's special expertise, background and qualifi-
cations.
80. See In re City Equitable Fire Ins. Co., 1 L.R.-Ch. 407, 428 (1925) (Eng.).
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strongly arguable that, in the AWA Appeal, Clarke and Sheller
J.JA. held that such personal deficiencies should not be taken
into account in determining what is required to satisfy the
duty.8 In Gamble v. Hoffman, Carr J., by reference to the
AWA Appeal, doubted whether the fact that the director "left
school at the age of 14 years, has no tertiary qualifications and
has spent his life '... essentially as a fruit and vegetable mar-
ket gardener'" justified a lower standard.82 The great difficul-
ty with the contrary view, that personal factors such as lack of
expertise, skill, experience and intelligence lower the standard
of conduct required of directors, is that, if accepted, the duty
ceases to be objective in any meaningful sense.'
C. What is the Director's Role?
Although a corporation has considerable freedom to divide
management functions within the corporation in any way it
considers appropriate,' in most corporations management
powers are specifically vested in the board.' However, the
board may delegate these management powers.86 In practice,
the extent of delegation, especially in large corporations, is
such that directors become monitors, rather than managers.87
The most notable feature of the 1990s cases on the duty of
care is that they place a limitation on the freedom of the board
81. See AWA Appeal (1995) 16 A.C.S.R. 607, 666; Gamble v. Hoffman (1997)
24 A.C.S.PR 369, 373; G. P. Stapledon, The CLERP Proposal in Relation to Section
232(4): The Duty of Care and Diligence, 16 COMPANY & SEc. L.J. 144 (1998).
82. Gamble v. Hoffmann (1997) 24 A.C.S.R. 369, 373. It is interesting to note
that in an earlier draft of the CLERP Bill, the statutory duty read: "A director or
other officer of a corporation must exercise their powers and discharge their duties
with the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person would exercise if
they: ... (c) had the director or other officer's experience." CLERP, Draft Legisla-
tive Provisions, 1998, pt. 2, § 2(1). This appeared to require consideration of per-
sonal factors such as lack of expertise and skills and, yet, it was claimed that the
amendment was consistent with AWA Appeal (1995) 16 A.C.S.R. 607. See CLERP
Proposal, supra note 58, at 45. Both this claim and the merits of this amendment
were severely criticized. See Stapledon, supra note 81. Paragraph (c) was omitted
from the CLERP Bill when it was presented to Parliament.
83. See AWA Appeal (1995) 16 A.C.S.R. 607, 666; Gamble v. Hoffman (1997)
24 A.C.S.R. 369, 373.
84. See AWA v. Daniels (1992) 7 A-C.S.R. 759, 865.
85. See Corporations Law, § 226A (Austl.).
86. The power to delegate is implicit in section 226A. See id. It will be ex-
plicitly outlined in the Corporations Law if the CLERP Bill is passed. See CLERP
Bill, § 198D, sched. 1. See also Corporations Law, §§ 226C, 226D.
87. See CLERP Proposal, supra note 58, at 22.
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to delegate." They stress that all directors must perform cer-
tain minimum management tasks. 9 In other words, a corpo-
ration cannot distribute management functions so that all or
any of its directors are nothing more than figure-heads: "the
days of the sleeping, or passive, director are well and truly
over." 9 This is the major difference between the current duty
of care and that expounded in the late 19th and early 20th
century. In 1911, Neville J. said a director "is not ... bound to
take any definite part in the conduct of the company's busi-
ness." 9 In contrast, in 1995 Clarke and Sheller J.J.A. confi-
dently asserted "the courts... have recognised that at law
more is required of a director than supine indifference. The
legislature requires both diligence and action." 2 Thus, regard-
less of the distribution of functions within the corporation, the
size and nature of the corporation's business and the director's
knowledge, skill and experience, a director's role now has a
minimum content. 93
It is not easy to describe this minimum content. There is
no dispute that all directors must read and understand the
corporation's financial reports. The insolvent trading cases
established that a director is required to have "sufficient
88. See, e.g., AWA Appeal (1995) 16 A.C.S.R. 607, 663, 668; Austl. Sec.
Comm'n v. Gallagher (1993) 10 A.C.S.R. 43, 54-55; In re Property Force Consul-
tants Pty, Ltd. (1995) 13 A.C.L.C. 1051, 1061.
89. See AWA Appeal (1995) 16 A.C.S.R. 607, 663, 668; Austl. Sec. Comm'n v.
Gallagher (1993) 10 A.C.S.R. 43, 54-55; In re Property Force Consultants Pty, Ltd.
(1995) 13 A.C.L.C. 1051, 1061.
90. Naffai v. Haines, Nov. 26, 1991, NSW (CA), unreported. See also, AWA
Appeal (1995) 16 A.C.S.R. 607, 663, 668. Cf Austl. Sec. Cornm'n v. Gallagher
(1993) 10 A.C.S.R. 43, 54-55. The court distanced itself from the magistrate's as-
sertion that the director's function was no more than "flag waving." Justice
Pidgeon asserted that the director still had certain responsibilities within the cor-
poration. Nevertheless, the director escaped liability because it was reasonable for
him to rely on the other directors who had more experience in banking, the busi-
ness of the company.
91. In re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates, Ltd., 1 L.R.-Ch. 425, 437
(1911) (Eng.). See, e.g., In re Denham, 25 Ch. D. 752 (1883) (Eng.), where a 'coun-
try gentleman' was held not to have breached his duty even though he had not
attended any board meetings for four years and, therefore, did not notice that the
chairman was falsifying the company's accounts.
92. AWA Appeal (1995) 16 A-C.S.R. 607, 657.
93. A court would presumably respect a provision in a corporate constitution
which specifically stated that a director, or directors, are not required to perform
any functions. Such a provision would be unusual but, nevertheless, it seems un-
likely that a director protected by such a provision would be held to have
breached the duty of care because of his or her passivity.
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knowledge and understanding of the company's affairs and its
financial records" to enable him or her to form an annual opin-
ion as to the solvency of the company.' Beyond this task, the
extent of the director's minimum role is not clear. In AWA v.
Daniels, Rogers C.J. said a director must guide and monitor
the management of the company." In particular, he described
the director's role as:
(1) to set goals for the corporation;
(2) to appoint the corporation's chief executive;
(3) to oversee the plans of managers for the acquisition and
organization of financial and human resources towards
attainment of the corporation's goals; and
(4) to review, at reasonable intervals, the corporation's prog-
ress towards attaining its goals. 6
In performing these functions, a director is not required to
become involved in the day-to-day management of the corpora-
tion, nor is he or she required to have a detailed knowledge of
the business.9" In essence, it appears that Rogers C.J. con-
ceived of a director as a person whose only essential contribu-
tion to the corporation is on matters of high policy.9" The ma-
jority in the AWA Appeal also described the director's role as
guiding and monitoring management.99 However, it appears
that they considered that this role involves more direct in-
volvement in the affairs of the company than Rogers C.J.
thought practicable."0 In their view, all directors must un-
derstand the business of the company and how it is run, be
informed about the activities of the corporation, regularly re-
view the company's financial reports and ensure that the board
is in a position to audit management.'
94. Statewide Tobacco v. Morley (1990) 2 A.C.S.R. 405, 412-13; Commonwealth
Bank v. Friedrich (1991) 5 A.C.S.R. 115, 125-26.
95. AWA v. Daniels (1992) 7 A.C.S.R. 759, 864.
96. Id. at 865-66.
97. See id.
98. See John Farrar, Corporate Governance, Business Judgment and the Profes-
sionalism of Directors, 6 CORP. & BUS. L.J. 1, 8 (1993).
99. AWA Appeal (1995) 16 A.C.S.R. 607, 664.
100. Compare AWA v. Daniels (1992) 7 A.C.S.R. 759, 865-69, with AWA Appeal
(1995) 16 A.C.S.R. 607, 664-68.
101. See AWA Appeal (1995) 16 A.C.S.R. 607, 664.
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D. Should a Director be Skillful and Diligent?
Traditionally, a director who possessed special skills was
required to display them,0 2 but a director was not required
to possess any skills."3 However, as stated above, the law
now requires that all directors fulfill a minimum role.0 4 Con-
sequently, all directors must now possess the degree of skill
necessary to fulfill this role. That is, at minimum, directors
must be able to read and understand the company's accounts,
evaluate the financial position of the company and understand
the company's business.' 5 A person who is incapable of per-
forming this minimum role should not accept the position of
director.06
This new approach may mean that the company is unable
to access certain specialist skills or perspectives at board level.
For example, neither a specialist geologist, nor an employee
representative, may sit on the board of a mining company
unless he or she is capable of understanding the company's
financial accounts. °7 The majority in the AWA Appeal ac-
knowledged and accepted this price, stating that "a director,
whatever his or her background, has a duty greater than that
of simply representing a particular field of experience."'08 In
any case, this may not be a high price to pay. A corporation
can easily access specialist skills through consultancies, rather
than directorships. Consultancies are less likely to be used by
a board to provide different perspectives, such as those of em-
ployees or consumers. However, the fact that diverse perspec-
tives are not represented at board level is consistent with the
Australian shareholder-centered model of the corporation.0 9
102. See In re Brazilian Rubber Plantation & Estates, Ltd., 1 L.R.-Ch. 425, 437
(1911) (Eng.); R. Macfarlan, Directors' Duties After the National Safety Council
Case: Directors' Duty of Care, 9 AUST. BAR REv. 269, 275 (1992).
103. See In re Brazilian Rubber Plantation & Estates, Ltd., 1 L.Ih-Ch. 425, 437
(1911) (Eng.); In re City Equitable Fire Ins. Co., 1 L.R.-Ch. 407, 428 (1925) (Eng.).
104. See discussion supra note 93 and accompanying text.
105. See Julie Cassidy, An Evaluation of Section 232(4) of the Corporations Law
and the Directors' Duty of Due Care, Skill and Diligence, 23 AUSTL. BUS. L. REV.
184, 187 (1995).
106. See AWA Appeal (1995) 16 A.C.S.R. 607, 666 (citing Francis v. United
Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (1981)).
107. Cf. M.J. Trebilcock, The Liability of Company Directors for Negligence, 32
MOD. L. REv. 499, 509-10 (1969).
108. AWA Appeal (1995) 16 A-C.S.R. 607, 664.
109. See CLERP Proposal, supra note 58, at 60.
BROOK J. 1NT'L L.
In line with the rejection of passive or sleeping directors,
the law now requires diligent attendance at meetings. A direc-
tor is required to attend all board meetings and all meetings of
committees on which he or she sits "unless exceptional circum-
stances, such as illness or absence from the State prevent him
or her from doing so.""' Moreover, the director must actually
participate in the meetings; he or she must bring an informed
mind to the meetings and exercise an independent judg-
ment."
1
The more difficult issue is how frequently the board or
committees should meet. It is accepted that a non-executive
director is not required to devote full-time attention to the
corporation." Beyond this there is a difference of approach,
at least in the AWA Cases."' Rogers C.J.'s approach is to lim-
it the extent of the non-executive's role by reference to the fact
the board only meets periodically."" The Court of Appeal, on
the other hand, approached the issue from the other end. The
majority defined the extent of diligence required by reference
to the director's role and, thus, said that the board should meet
as often as is necessary to fulfill its role."5 The latter ap-
proach increases the possibility of a breach of duty by a board
that does not meet sufficiently frequently.
E. Passing the Buck-Delegation and Reliance on Others
It is clear that directors are entitled to delegate the bulk of
their management functions and to rely on their delegates to
perform their functions properly. There are numerous cases in
which the directors have escaped liability because they had
relied on other directors," 6 management 7 or auditors".8
110. Vrisakis v. Austl. Sec. Comm'n (1993) 9 WA.R. 395, 405.
111. See AWA v. Daniels (1992) 7 A.C.S.R. 759, 864-65.
112. See id. at 867; Vrisakis v. Austl. Sec. Comm'n (1993) 9 W.A.R. 395, 405;
AWA Appeal (1995) 16 A-C.S.R. 607, 657.
113. See AWA v. Daniels (1992) 7 A.C.S.R. 759; AWA Appeal (1995) 16
A-C.S.R. 607.
114. See AWA v. Daniels (1992) 7 A.C.S.R. 759, 867.
115. AWA Appeal (1995) 16 A.C.S.R. 607, 664.
116. See, e.g., Austl. Sec. Comm'n v. Gallagher (1993) 10 A.C.S.R. 43; Biala v.
Mallina (1993) 11 A-C.S.R 785.
117. See AWA v. Daniels (1992) 7 A.C.S.R. 759; AWA Appeal (1995) 16
A.C.S.R. 607.
118. See AWA v. Daniels (1992) 7 A.C.S.R. 759; AWA Appeal (1995) 16
A.C.S.R. 607; Vrisakis v. Austl. Sec. Comm'n (1993) 9 W-A.R. 395.
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to perform their management functions.
Nevertheless, there are limitations on the extent of per-
missible delegation. Directors cannot delegate to such an ex-
tent that they abdicate all responsibility;, that is, all directors
must fulfill the minimum role. Additionally, the circumstances
of the particular case may be such that the director must per-
sonally perform far more than these minimal tasks. For exam-
ple, in Permanent Building Society v. Wheeler,"9 the Full
Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia held that a
director who abstained from voting because of a conflict of
interest had breached his duty of care. The fact that the direc-
tor was the chief executive and managing director of the com-
pany and that the transaction being considered was extremely
risky and one in which the remainder of the board had no
expertise, meant that the director could not delegate his obli-
gation to review the transaction. The court held that regard-
less of his conflict of interest, the director should have person-
ally ensured that the other directors appreciated the harm
inherent in the transaction, pointed out ways in which that
harm could be reduced, and ensured the company would be
provided with adequate security.
The final limitation on the extent of permissible delegation
is that directors are not entitled to rely on a delegate if they
are aware that the delegate is not properly performing the
delegated task.'0 The degree of notice that renders reliance
improper is another point of difference between the courts in
the AWA Cases. According to Rogers C.J., reliance upon man-
agement or others is only improper if the director has unam-
biguous notice that the persons so entrusted are not properly
performing their delegated tasks. He stated that:
Reliance would only be unreasonable where the director was
aware of circumstances of such a character, so plain, so mani-
fest and so simple of appreciation that no person, with any
degree of prudence, acting on his behalf, would have relied on
the particular judgment information and advice of the offi-
cers."2
119. (1994) 14 A.C.S.R. 109. Note this case has been criticized as imposing too
onerous a duty on directors. See Baxt, supra note 58, at 428-30.
120. See AWA v. Daniels (1992) 7 A.C.S.R. 759, 868; AWA Appeal (1995) 16
A.C.S.R. 607, 666.
121. AWA v. Daniels (1992) 7 A.C.S.R. 759, 868.
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This approach is even more indulgent of directors than
that in In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., and was
specifically rejected by the majority judges in the Court of
Appeal.' They clearly expected more diligent monitoring of
delegates. Thus, they held- that delegation ceases to be per-
missible if directors "know, or by the exercise of ordinary care
should have known, any facts which would awaken suspicion
and put a prudent man on his guard.""
VI. THE CLERP REFORMS-BACK TO THE FUTURE
Dissatisfaction with the more onerous duty, and the uncer-
tainty created by the judicial contributions of the past decade,
prompted the government to propose a number of duty of care
reforms as part of CLERP. These reforms, which are now em-
bodied in the CLERP Bill, are examined in this section.
A. Business Judgment Rule
Section 180(2), schedule 1 of the CLERP Bill provides that
directors, who make a business judgment, will be taken to
have complied with the duty of care, if they:
(a) make the judgment in good faith for a proper purpose;
and
(b) do not have a material personal interest in the subject
matter of the judgment; and
(c) inform themselves about the subject matter of the judg-
ment to the extent they reasonably believe to be appro-
priate; and
(d) rationally believe that the judgment is in the best inter-
ests of the corporation."
The legislature intends that this rule will operate, like its
American counterpart, as a presumption in favor of directors,
122. 1 L.R.-Ch. 407 (1925) (Eng.). See Paul Redmond, Safe Harbours or Sleepy
Hollows: Does Australia Need a Statutory Business Judgment Rule, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND THE DUTIES OF COMPANY DmECTORS, supra note 5, at 185, 187.
123. See AWA Appeal (1995) 16 A.C.S.R. 607, 665.
124. Id. at 666 (citing Rankin v. Cooper, 149 F. 1010, 1013 (1907)). For a com-
parative discussion of the duty of oversight under U.S. and Australian law, see
Jennifer Hill, Deconstructing Sunbeam-Contemporary Issues in Corporate Gover-
nance, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1099 (1999).
125. CLERP Bill, supra note 9, § 180(2), sched. 1.
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with the onus on the plaintiff to prove that the director did not
satisfy the five criteria in the rule.2 e That is, it is intended
that the plaintiff must show that the director did not make a
business judgment 7 or that he or she did not comply with
paragraphs (a) to (d). A plaintiff who manages to do this must
then establish that the director has breached the duty of care.
It is highly unlikely that this import 8 into Australian
law will affect the outcome of litigation. As stated above, in
spite of the large number of recent cases, only a handful of
directors have been held to have breached their duty of care,
and even fewer have had judgments entered against them."
Generally, judgments were only entered against directors who,
in addition to breaching the duty of care, had a conflict of.in-
terest or breached their duty to act bona fide for the benefit of
the company and for a proper purpose.3 ' The business judg-
ment rule would not have protected these directors. 3' Direc-
tors who have a material personal interest in the subject mat-
ter of a decision are prevented from entering the business
judgment safe harbor by paragraph (b) and those who have
breached the duty to act bona fide for the benefit of the compa-
126. See Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Bill 1998, Explanatory Mem-
orandum, at 18 [hereinafter CLERP Bill Explanatory Memo]. Compare Deborah A-
DeMott, Legislating Business Judgment-A Comment from the United States, 16
COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 575, 576 (1998), in which it is argued that the "language [of
the rule] appears more apt to place the onus on the director." See also G.F.K
Santow, Codification of Directors' Duties, 73 AUST. L.J. 336, 348-49 (1999).
127. See CLERP Bill, supra note 9, § 180(2), sched. 1. This requirement is
derived from the opening words of the rule which refer to a "director or other
officer of a corporation who makes a business judgment." Id. § 180(3), sched. 1.
"Business judgment" is defined as "any decision to take or not take action in re-
spect of a matter relevant to the business operations of the corporation." Id. §
180(3), sched. 1. The U.S. business judgment rule also only protects directors'
decisions. Omissions or failures of oversight are not covered by the rule. See
Charles Hansen, The Duty of Care, the Business Judgment Rule, and The Ameri-
can Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 48 Bus. LAW. 1355, 1356-60
(1993). It has been suggested that the proposed Australian rule covers a narrower
range of directorial conduct than the U.S. business judgment rule, because its
protection is confined, by section 180(3), sched. 1, to business judgments which are
"relevant to business operations." DeMott, supra note 126, at 577.
128. The business judgment rule in the CLERP Bill is closely modelled on the
American Law Institute's business judgment rule. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c) (1994).
129. See discussion supra note 55.
130. See id.
131. See Larelle Law, The Business Judgment Rule in Australia: A Reappraisal
Since the AWA Case, 15 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 174, 188 (1997).
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ny and for a proper purpose will not satisfy the preconditions
to protection in paragraphs (a) and (d).
Likewise, paragraph (c) is unlikely to affect the develop-
ment of the law. Under the current duty of care a director
may, in theory, be liable if either the decision-making process-
es or decisions fail to meet the requisite standard of care. The
effect of paragraph (c) is to shift the focus of the duty away
from the merits of decisions and on to one aspect of the deci-
sion-making process, that is, the informational base on which
decisions are made. Failure to gather the requisite informa-
tion, rather than poor decisions, will attract liability.'32 How-
ever, the impact of this shift in focus will be largely symbolic.
Under the current law, the prospect of liability attaching to
poor decisions is remote. Judges are extremely reluctant to
review the merits of business decisions. 33 On the other hand,
even in the late 19th century cases, the courts were prepared
to take some notice of defects in the decision-making pro-
cess 4 and the recent cases stress the importance of being in-
formed.3 ' In other words, emphasis on the review of the deci-
sion-making process, rather than the actual decision, is implic-
it in the current law.
Finally, the requirement that directors actually make a
business decision or judgment means that a significant range
of conduct will be denied the protection of the business judg-
ment rule. Failures to respond to business crises or failures to
monitor or review the conduct of delegates and subordinates
will still be judged by the standards laid down in cases such as
the AWA Appeal. Again, this refusal to allow those who fail to
make a decision to enter the safe harbor provided by the busi-
ness judgment rule reinforces, rather than alters, the current
law. In practice, it is those who fail to take part in the deci-
sion-making process, not those who make decisions, that are
132. The U.S. business judgment rule also means that "due care examination
has focused on a board's decisionmaking process." See Citron v. Fairchild Camera
& Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del. 1989).
133. See, e.g., Harlowe's Nominees Pty, Ltd. v. Woodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil
Co. (1968) 121 C.L.R. 483, 493; Howard Smith, Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum, Ltd.
(1974) A.C. 821, 835; Turquand v. Marshall, 4 L.R.-Ch. App. 376, 386 (1869)
(Eng.).
134. See JOHN E. PARMISON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY: ISSUES
IN THE THEORY OF COMPANY LAW 110-11 (1993).
135. See AWA v. Daniels (1992) 7 A.C.S.R. 759, 864-65; Austl. Sec. Comm'n v.
Gallagher (1993) 10 A.C.S.R. 43, 53.
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currently caught by the duty of care. Judges may be reluctant
to review the merits of business decisions'36 but, as the insol-
vent trading cases and dicta in the AWA Appeal show, 37 they
are willing to punish passivity.
Thus, the business judgment rule will not give directors
greater or lesser protection than they currently enjoy. Direc-
tors who can satisfy the five criteria of the rule will not be
judged by the statutory or case law duty of care. However, in
all probability, they would be able to satisfy that duty if it
were applied to them. On the other hand, directors who fail to
satisfy one of the five criteria will still be subject to the exist-
ing duty of care.
The fact that the business judgment rule is unlikely to
affect the outcome of litigation raises questions about its utili-
ty. In Directors" Duties and Corporate Governance: Proposals
for Reform: Paper No. 3 (CLERP Proposal), the rule is justified
on the basis that it will encourage entrepreneurial risk-taking
and, therefore, enhance shareholder wealth.' The need to
encourage risk-taking has already shaped both the common
law and statutory duty of care."9 Judges are clearly cogni-
zant of the need to avoid applying the duty of care in a way
which will "dampen business enterprise and penalise legiti-
mate but unsuccessful entrepreneurial activity.""' However,
in spite of this judicial sensitivity to the risk-taking role of
directors, the uncertainty of the current duty of care has, ac-
cording to the CLERP Proposal, caused directors to engage in
136. See, e.g., Harlowe's Nominees Pty, Ltd. v. Woodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil
Co. (1968) 121 C.L.R. 483, 493; Howard Smith, Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum, Ltd.
(1974) A.C. 821, 835; Turquand v. Marshall, 4 L.R.-Ch. App. 376, 386 (1869)
(Eng.).
137. AWA Appeal (1995) 16 A.C.S.R. 607, 657, 661-664, 668. See also Statewide
Tobacco v. Morley (1990) 2 A.C.S.R. 405; Commonwealth Bank of Austl. v.
Friedrich (1991) 5 A.C.S.R. 115; Morley v. Statewide Tobacco Servs., Ltd. (1992) 8
A.C.S.R. 305.
138. See CLERP Proposal, supra note 58, at 22-23. See also, Alan Cameron,
The Perspective of the Australian Securities Commission on the Enforcement of
Directors' Duties and the Role of the Courts: A Comment, in CORPORATE GOVER-
NANCE AND THE DUTIES OF COMPANY DIRECTORS, supra note 5, at 205, 205-06;
Australian Institute of Company Directors, Duty of Care and the Business Judg-
ment Rule: Submission to Department of Treasury/CLERP, June 1997, at 3.
139. See, e.g., Vrisakis v. Austl. Sec. Comm'n (1993) 9 WA.R. 395, 449-50;
AWA Appeal (1995) 16 A.C.S.I 607, 664; Permanent Bldg. Soc'y v. Wheeler (1994)
14 A.C.S.R. 109, 159; CLRB Explanatory Memo, supra note 59, para. 87.
140. Vrisakis v. Austl. Sec. Comm'n (1993) 9 W-A.R. 395, 449.
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conservative, risk-averse behavior.' The CLERP Proposal
paints a picture of directors who are so paralysed by judge-
made confusion that they are unable to fulfill their task of
generating wealth for shareholders and the society in gener-
al.14
2
There are, undoubtedly, areas of uncertainty in the cur-
rent law but an analysis of all recent cases, rather than just
the two AWA Cases, shows that some clear and settled princi-
ples have developed.' In any case, there are many un-
knowns surrounding the business judgment rule in the CLERP
Bill. It involves a number of concepts untested in Australian
courts and, thus, it will be some time before lawyers can confi-
dently advise directors on its meaning. In spite of its similarity
to the American Law Institute's business judgment rule,'"
American jurisprudence may well be of limited assistance in
interpreting the Australian rule. The restrictive definition of
"business judgment" in the CLERP Bill is likely to confine the
area of operation of the Australian rule compared to its Ameri-
can counterpart.' Moreover, it is difficult to predict how
judges will interpret even those parts of the rule which rely on
concepts already familiar to Australian corporate lawyers. The
notion of "material personal interest," found in paragraph (b)
of the rule, is used elsewhere in the legislation but there is no
real guidance as to its meaning in either the legislation or the
case law.'46 Paragraphs (a) and (d) almost mirror the duty to
act bona fide for the benefit of the company and for a proper
purpose.47 However, the body of case law on this duty is not
noted for its clarity.
Having said this, it is the perception of certainty, rather
than certainty itself, which is required to pacify directors and
liberate their entrepreneurial spirit. The business judgment
rule may create sufficient illusion of certainty as to free direc-
141. CLERP Proposal, supra note 58, at 22-23.
142. Id.
143. See Sievers, supra note 56, at 408.
144. See discussion supra note 128.
145. See discussion supra note 127.
146. See FORD ET AL., supra note 28, para. 9.150.
147. Paragraph (d) requires that the director "rationally" believe that his or her
judgment is in the best interests of the corporation. The existing law merely re-
quires a subjective belief. See Smith & Fawcett, Ltd, Ch. 304, 306 (1942) (Eng.).
The inconsistency, however, is unlikely to cause difficulty.
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tors from the paralysis that is allegedly caused by the current
law. It provides a "checklist" against which directors can mea-
sure their decisions, rather than an open-ended test. It should
be easier for directors to satisfy themselves that they have
complied with the checklist, than it is for them to assure them-
selves that their actual decision is one that a reasonable direc-
tor in a similar position and in a similar corporation would
make. The brevity of the list is also an advantage. Under the
current law it would be almost impossible to provide directors
with a hundred word description of what they must do to satis-
fy their duty.
Thus, the business judgment rule in the CLERP Bill is
unlikely to have a great impact on the development of the law.
It will not substantially affect the outcome of litigation. How-
ever, it may give directors sufficient peace of mind and free
them to take risks. That is, its greatest effect is likely to be
psychological. The situation has been neatly summarized by a
member of the Business Regulation Advisory Group, which
advised the government on the proposed reform. He said that
the business judgment rul& "does no more than codify what the
law is at the moment. But you do need something to stop direc-
tors spending 95 per cent of their time making sure their back-
sides are covered. It's a shocking waste."'4
B. Statutory Recognition of the Right to Delegate
The CLERP Bill attempts to proscribe the limits of
directors' rights to delegate their functions and to rely on ad-
vice and information provided by employees, professional ad-
visers, experts, officers and other directors.49 This attempt
was prompted by uncertainty about the extent of permissible
delegation, created by the difference of approach to this issue
in the two AWA Cases.5 ' Again, it is feared that this uncer-
tainty "could lead to an overly conservative approach to man-
agement and could impede the decision-making processes with-
in a company."' 5
148. Trevor Sykes, Why the Minimalist Model May Harm Investors, AUSTL. FIN.
REv., Mar. 19, 1998, at 15 (quoting Leigh Hall).
149. CLERP Bill, supra note 9, §§ 189, 190, sched. 1.
150. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
151. CLERP Bill Explanatory Memo, supra note 126, at 29.
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Section 198D, schedule 1 of the CLERP Bill specifically
recognizes directors' right to delegate any of their powers to a
single director, a committee of directors, an employee or any
other person, unless the company's constitution provides other-
wise.'52 Section 190(2), schedule 1 of the Bill provides that a
director is not responsible for the delegate's exercise of power
provided:
(a) the director believed on reasonable grounds at all times
that the delegate would exercise the power in conformity
with the duties imposed on directors of the company by
this Law and the company's constitution (if any); and
(b) the director believed:
(i) on reasonable grounds; and
(ii) in good faith; and
(iii) after making proper inquiry if the circumstances
indicated the need for inquiry;
that the delegate was reliable and competent in relation
to the power. delegated."
Section 189, schedule 1, provides that in an action for
breach of duty, a director's reliance on information or advice
provided by an employee, professional adviser, expert, officer,
director, or a committee of directors will be presumed to be
reasonable, provided certain conditions are met.'4 First, the
director must believe, on reasonable grounds, that the employ-
ee is reliable and competent in relation to matters relied upon
or that the advice is within the professional adviser's or
expert's area of competence."'5 Alternatively, if the director
has relied upon information from an officer, director or com-
mittee of directors, those persons must be acting within au-
thority in providing that information.'56 Second, the director's
reliance on the information or advice must be in good faith.6 7
Finally, the reliance must be made "after making proper inqui-
ry if the circumstances indicated the need for inquiry."'
Even if these conditions are satisfied, the presumption of rea-
152. CLERP Bill, supra note 9, § 198D, sched. 1.
153. Id- § 190(2), sched. 1.
154. See id. § 189, sched. 1.
155. See id. § 189(a)(i)(ii), sched. 1.
156. See id. § 189(a)(iii)(iv), sched. 1.
157. See id. § 189(b)(i), sched. 1.
158. See id. § 189(b)(ii), sched. 1.
580 [Vol. XXV:3
1999] AUSTRALIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
sonable reliance can be rebutted.'59
The weakness of these provisions is that they do little to
resolve the uncertainty created by the difference of opinion in
the AWA Cases. The most significant dispute between Rogers
C.J. and the majority of the Court of Appeal was the issue of
when circumstances indicate that the directors should make
further inquiry before relying on actions of or information
provided by delegates. 6 ' The sections do not resolve this dis-
pute; they merely state that a director is only entitled to pro-
tection if he or she made proper inquiry when "the circum-
stances indicated the need for inquiry."6' Section 190 also
leaves open the question of when a director has "reasonable
grounds" to believe that a delegate will exercise the power in
conformity with the director's duties. If the courts interpret the
provision in conformity with the decision of Rogers C.J., the
director's belief may be reasonable unless he or she has unam-
biguous notice of a failure to comply with relevant standards
imposed on directors.'62 Alternatively, the courts could inter-
pret the section in accordance with the sentiments expressed
in the AWA Appeal. This would lead to the conclusion that a
director's belief is not reasonable, if the director "know[s], or by
the exercise of ordinary care should have known, any facts
which would awaken suspicion and put a prudent man on his
guard."" The latter interpretation is more consistent with
the usual construction of "reasonable person" tests. Similar
uncertainty exists about what will constitute belief on reason-
able grounds that an employee or delegate is reliable and com-
petent."M Given that the onus is on the director to prove that
he or she has satisfied the many conditions in these sections,
the uncertainty should be a matter of considerable concern for
directors.
159. See CLERP Bill Explanatory Memo, supra note 126, at 29.
160. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
161. CLERP Bill, supra note 9, §§ 189(b)(ii), 190(2)(b)(iii), sched. 1.
162. See AWA v. Daniels (1992) 7 A.C.S.R. 759, 868.
163. AWA Appeal (1995) 16 A-C.S.R. 607, 666 (quoting Rankin v. Cooper, 149
F. 1010, 1013 (1907)).
164. See CLERP Bill, supra note 9, §§ 189(a)(i), 190(2)(b), sched. 1. See David
Goddard, Company Law Reform-Lessons from the New Zealand Experience, 16
COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 236, 246-47 (1998).
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C. Amendment of the Statutory Duty of Care
In an earlier draft of the CLERP Bill the statutory duty of
care was amended to make it more subjective. Courts were
directed to consider directors' experience, as well as their posi-
tion in the corporation and the corporation's circumstances,
when determining the standard of care required of direc-
tors." This amendment was abandoned and the statutory
duty of care in the Bill presented to Parliament merely alters
the wording, but not the meaning, of the current statutory
duty of care. It provides:
A director or other officer of a corporation must exercise their
powers and discharge their duties with the degree of care and
diligence that a reasonable person would exercise if they:
(a) were a director or officer of a corporation in the
corporation's circumstances; and
(b) occupied the office held by, and had the same re-
sponsibility within the corporation, as the director
or officer."
VII. THE SPECTER OF SHAREHOLDER LIABILiTY
Traditional liability principles in Australian corporate law
assumed a division between ownership and control. Fiduciary
and statutory duties were restricted to directors of the compa-
ny, since managerial power was generally exclusively vested in
the board of directors under corporate constitutions, 167 with
shareholders essentially viewed as "innocent bystanders." Both
the responsibility and the accountability of shareholders were
limited under this model. Shareholders owed no fiduciary du-
ties, and received the protection of limited liability. Sharehold-
ers, and other groups such as creditors, were also usually pro-
tected from liability, such as tortious liability for the acts of
the corporation, by strict adherence to the separate entity
doctrine, which has been upheld by the Australian High Court
in a number of cases.' 8
165. See discussion supra note 82.
166. CLERP Bill, supra note 9, § 180(1), sched. 1.
167. See Corporations Law, § 226A (Austl.).
168. See Walker v. Wimborne (1976) 137 C.L.R. 1; Industrial Equity, Ltd. v.
Blackburn (1977) 137 C.L.R. 567.
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Recent developments in the area of shadow director liabili-
ty, however, have extended potential liability to other persons
closely associated with the corporate enterprise and created
incursions into the separate entity doctrine.'69 Those who are
at risk of liability under these developments.. include: hold-
ing companies and controlling shareholders, directors of hold-
ing companies, banks and other financial institutions, 7' and
professional advisers and experts.'72 A number of recent cas-
es have focused specifically on the issue of liability of a holding
company for the actions of its subsidiary.
A basic principle under Australian and New Zealand law
is that complete control of the board of a subsidiary by its
parent is regarded as insufficient to disregard the corporate
veil.' In Briggs v. James Hardie & Co. Pty,74 Rogers
A.J.A. stated that were this not so, the corporate veil could be
discarded in virtually every holding company and wholly-
owned subsidiary scenario.' v This approach was upheld in
the 1995 New Zealand decision, Dairy Containers, Ltd. v. NZI
Bank, Ltd.,'76 where the court rejected an argument that, be-
cause the New Zealand Dairy Board (NZDB) had the ability to
exercise almost complete control over its wholly-owned sub-
169. See generally, Jennifer Hill, Corporate Groups, Creditor Protection and
Cross Guarantees: Australian Perspectives, 24 CANADIAN Bus. L.J. 321, 334 ff
(1995); 38 CORP. PRAC. COMMENTATOR 381, 394 ff (1996).
170. See Robyn Carroll, Shadow Director and Other Third Party Liability for
Corporate Activity, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE DUTIES OF COMPANY DI-
RECTORS, supra note 5, at 162, 163; Pearlie M. C. Koh, Shadow Director, Shadow
Director, Who Art Thou?, 14 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 340, 342-43 (1996).
171. See generally the discussion on the blurring of the boundary between debt
and equity in Jennifer Hill, Public Beginnings, Private Ends-Should Corporate
Law Privilege the Interests of Shareholders?, 9 AusTL. J. CORP. L. 21, 24 (1998).
See also Koh, supra note 170, at 348-49; Stephen Girvin, Statutory Liability of
Shadow Directors, 1995 JURID. REV. 414, 422. Cf. Campbell, Liability as a Shadow
Director, 1994 JBL 609, 614. In the U.S. context, see Stuart C. Gilson & Michael
R. Vetsuypens, Creditor Control in Financially Distressed Firms: Empirical Evi-
dence, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1005, 1014 (1994), suggesting that one reason why U.S.
banks are reluctant to acquire board seats is the increased risk of liability.
172. An exception exists under section 60(2) for persons acting in a business
capacity or according to a business relationship, however it has been said that
"the fine line which divides an adviser and a shadow director can be difficult to
draw." Carroll, supra note 170, at 162, 163 n.7.
173. See Briggs v. James Hardie & Co. Pty (1989) 7 A.C.L.C. 841.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. (1995) 13 A.C.L.C. 3211.
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sidiary Dairy Containers Ltd. (DCL) through nominee direc-
tors, the parent therefore owed a duty of care to the subsid-
iary. According to the judge, the existence of such a duty of
care would impose a positive monitoring function on the parent
company, which according to Thomas J. was "going too
far."'" Nonetheless, where the control of the parent company
shifts beyond "general or usual control"78 over its subsidiary,
particularly where it involves actual interference, the parent
company may be held accountable on a range of grounds.'79
One possible basis of liability, which was rejected by the
Privy Council in Kuwait Asia Bank EC v. National Mutual Life
Nominees, Ltd.,80 but given support in obiter comments in
Dairy Containers, Ltd. v. NZI Bank, Ltd., 8' is that the par-
ent company may be vicariously liable for the acts of its em-
ployees, who sit as nominee directors on the subsidiary
company's board. Although in Australia, there is one deci-
sion adopting a strict principle that a nominee director has an
overwhelming duty to the company and not to an appoin-
tor," there are a number of decisions where the courts have
taken a more pragmatic and commercial approach to nominee
directors, declining to intervene even though a director has
clearly given overriding consideration to, or acted solely in the
interests of, an appointor."
In the Dairy Containers case, Thomas J. used this latter
177. "[Blut it is going too far to suggest that [NZDB] must undertake the mon-
itoring functions reposed in the directors of DCL which it has appointed to look
after its interests." Dairy Containers v. NZI Bank (1995) 13 A.C.L.C. 3211, 3237
(per Thomas J.). On this issue, see also Prentice, supra note 6, at 25, 26, who
asks whether the concept of managerial accountability implies the imposition of
some corollary obligation on shareholders.
178. Dairy Containers v. NZI Bank (1995) 13 A.C.L.C. 3211, 3237.
179. See id.
180. 3 All E.R. 404 (1990) (Eng.).
181. (1995) 13 A.C.L.C. 3211, 3244. See also E. W. Thomas, The Role of Nomi-
nee Directors and the Liability of their Appointors, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
THE DUTIES OF COIIPANY DIRECTORS, supra note 5, at 148, 156-60.
182. See generally Carroll, supra note 170, at 167-69. As Carroll points out,
since Australian courts are not bound by Privy Council decisions, it is not clear
whether they will adopt the Kuwait Asia Bank approach or that of Thomas J. in
the Dairy Containers case on the issue of vicarious liability. Id. at 168.
183. See Bennetts v. Bd. of Fire Comm'rs of NSW (1967) 87 W.N. (Pt 1) (NSW)
307. See also Kuwait Asia Bank EC v. Nat'l Mut. Life Nominees, Ltd., 3 All E.R.
404, 424 (1990) (Eng.), for dicta supporting this strict position.
184. See, e.g., Levin v. Clark [1962] N.S.W.R. 686; In re Broadcasting Station
2GB Pty, Ltd. [1964-65] N.S.W.R. 1648.
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group of cases in support of recognition of potential vicarious
liability for the negligent acts of a holding company's employ-
ees appointed to the board of a subsidiary company. The judge
stated that [riecognising the economic reality of employee-
directors and their employers requires that those who employ
employees as directors to represent their interests accept re-
sponsibility for their resulting conduct.""8 As a matter of
principle, the judge could see no reason why the relationship
between employer and employee-directors should fall outside
the ambit of the general doctrine of vicarious liability.'86 The
approach advocated by Thomas J. echoes concerns of corporate
theorists that a central problem in corporate groups is a
disjunction, whereby action, but not responsibility, may be
collectivized within group structures.8 7
A proposed reform under the CLERP Bill will adjust the
traditional fiduciary duties of nominee directors of a wholly-
owned subsidiary company, by expressly authorizing them to
act solely in the best interests of the parent company in certain
circumstances."M It will be interesting to see whether the im-
plementation of this reform provides further support for Thom-
as J.'s approach in seeking the expansion of liability for ap-
185. Dairy Containers v. NZI Bank (1995) 13 A.C.L.C. 3211, 3244.
186. See id.
187. See, e.g., PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCE-
DURAL PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 1-25
(1983); Hugh Collins, Ascription of Legal Responsibility to Groups in Complex Pat-
terns of Economic Integration, 53 MOD. L. REV. 731 (1990); Gunther Teubner, Be-
yond Contract And Organization? The External Liability of Franchising Systems in
German Law, in FRANCHISING AND THE LAW: THEORETICAL AND COMPARATIVE AP-
PROACHES IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 105 (Christian Joerges ed., 1991);
Gunther Teubner, Unitas Multiplex: Corporate Governance in Group Enterprises, in
REGULATING CORPORATE GROUPS IN EUROPE 67 (David Sugarman & Gunther
Teubner eds., 1990).
188. Under CLERP Bill, supra note 9, § 187, sched. 1, a director of a wholly-
owned subsidiary will be taken to have acted in good faith in the best interests of
the subsidiary if:
(a) the constitution of the subsidiary expressly authorises the director to
act in the best interests of the holding company; and
(b) the director acts in good faith in the best interests of the holding
company;, and
(c) the subsidiary is not insolvent at the time the director acts and does
not become insolvent because of the director's act.
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pointors as the flip-side to recognition of commercial con-
trol.1
89
Another important basis on which liability may be im-
posed on a shareholder and/or third party is as a "shadow
director." Under section 60(1) of the Corporations Law, there is
an extended definition of the term "director" to include "a per-
son in accordance with whose directions or instructions the
directors of the body are accustomed to act." 90 Although a
corporation cannot be formally appointed as a director under
Australian law,'9' it may nonetheless qualify as a shadow di-
rector. The extended definition of director in section 60(1) pres-
ents particular dangers to third parties when it is conjoined
with the duty of directors to prevent insolvent trading under
section 588G of the Corporations Law.
The decision in Standard Chartered Bank of Australia,
Ltd. v. Antico'92 provides a good example of shadow director
liability. A claim was brought against Pioneer International
Ltd. under the insolvent trading provision.' A key issue in
the case was whether Pioneer International Ltd., which owned
42% of Giant Resources Ltd. and had appointed three nominee
directors to the board of Giant, was a shadow director of Giant.
Although, in accordance with standard entity principles, the
size of its stake in Giant and representation on Giant's board
were insufficient to render Pioneer a shadow director, addition-
al features of the case reversed this position.'94 Not only did
Pioneer have effective control of Giant, through wide dispersal
of other shares in the company, but evidence showed that it
interfered in, and usurped, major strategic decisions of Giant
on a number of occasions, and that it imposed Pioneer group
financial reporting requirements on Giant.9 ' Furthermore,
an agreement by Pioneer to provide funding to Giant contained
preconditions, such as a requirement that no new financial
arrangements be entered into without Pioneer's approval and
189. See Thomas, supra note 181, at 148.
190. Corporations Law, § 60(1)(b) (Austl.).
191. See id. § 221(3).
192. (1995) 13 A.C.L.C. 1381.
193. See id. The relevant provision was then section 556 of the Companies
Code, and is now Corporations Law, § 588G (Austl.).
194. See Standard Chartered Bank v. Antico (1995) 13 A.C.L.C. 1381, 1436 ff.
195. See id. at 1437
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that all payments be approved by Pioneer.'96 The judge ac-
cepted that these factors showed not only a willingness to
control, but actuality of control sufficient to render Pioneer a
shadow director of Giant.1
97
Again, under shadow director principles, it appears that
the law is attempting to bypass the separate entity principle
and create greater congruence between control and account-
ability. As Finn J. has stated, the central concern under sec-
tion 60(1)(b) is "[w]here, for some or all purposes, is the locus
of effective decision making?"' This underlying principle
may be useful in determining a number of issues in shadow
director liability which are yet to be resolved satisfactorily,
such as whether there is any requirement that formal direc-
tions and instructions must be issued; whether directions or
instructions must be given to, and followed by, all members of
the board or only a majority of them; under what circumstanc-
es directors of a parent company may be liable as shadow di-
rectors of a subsidiary; and what level of consistency is re-
quired to show that the directors are "accustomed to act" in
accordance with another person's directions. 9
Another statutory path by which liability may be attribut-
ed to a parent company is under section 588V of the Corpora-
tions Law."' This provision, which was introduced in 1992,
provides a relatively direct form of liability in a parent compa-
ny where there has been insolvent trading by the subsid-
iary.2"' The element of control or domination, which is central
to establishing that a parent company is a shadow director, is
not a prerequisite to liability under section 588V.2"' Finally,
the oppression provision, section 246AA of the Corporations
196. See id. at 1438.
197. See id. at 1440.
198. Austl. Sec. Comm'n v. AS Nominees, Ltd. (1995) 13 A.C.L.C. 1822, 1838.
199. See Koh, supra note 170, at 343-47; Carroll, supra note 170, at 181-83;
Girvin, supra note 171, at 415; Campbell, supra note 171, at 609.
200. Corporations Law, § 588V (Austl.).
201. Under section 588V, a parent company may become liable for debts in-
curred by a subsidiary if, at the time the debt is incurred the holding company or
its directors were aware of reasonable grounds for suspecting that the subsidiary
was, or would become, insolvent, or should have been so aware given the "nature
and extent" of the parent company's control over the subsidiary. Id.
202. See generally Ian M. Ramsay, Holding Company Liability for the Debts of
an Insolvent Subsidiary: A Law and Economics Perspective, 17 U.N.S.W.L.R. 520
(1994).
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Law, is very flexible and has been used in the context of cor-
porate groups203 to prevent unfair domination by parent com-
panies and their nominees.2" These diverse developments
represent an interesting retreat by the law from the conse-
quences of a paradigm of the shareholder as "innocent bystand-
er," when such a characterization clearly fails to reflect coin-
mercial reality.
VIII. PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS FOR SHAREHOLDERS IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-SHAREHOLDERS AS COR-
PORATE MONITORS
There is a tension in contemporary Australian law as to
the appropriate role of shareholders in corporate governance
and what participatory rights they should possess." 5 Some
reforms, such as those relating to company meetings and the
proposed introduction of a statutory derivative suit, are de-
signed to give shareholders a greater role in corporate gover-
nance, particularly in monitoring managerial conduct.0 '
Nonetheless, other reforms are clearly designed to confer far
greater autonomy on directors in exercising their powers.0 7
Australian corporate law has traditionally restricted the
participatory: role of shareholders in corporate governance.2 8
For example, when managerial powers are vested in the direc-
tors under the company's constitution, the general meeting is
powerless to override decisions of the board,0 9 even by unani-
mous shareholder agreement.
The technical rules on company meetings also reflected
management's central role in corporate governance, and the
peripheral one occupied by shareholders.210 Decisions such as
203. See, e.g., In re Spargos Mining NL (1990) 8 A.C.L.C. 1218, 1253.
204. See generally Jennifer Hill, Protecting Minority Shareholders and Reason-
able Expectations, 10 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 86 (1992).
205. See generally Jennifer Hill, Changes in the Role of the Shareholder, in
CORPORATE PERSONALITY IN THE 20TH CENTURY 175 (Charles E.F. Rickett & Ross
B. Grantham eds., 1998).
206. See, e.g., Company Law Review Bill, 1997, Explanatory Memorandum,
para. 10.1, If.
207. See generally id. para. 12.1, if.
208. See generally Hill, supra note 205, at 182 If.
209. This was in accordance with the English decision in Automatic Self-
Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. v. Cuninghame, 2 Ch. 34 (1906) (Eng.).
210. On the status of shareholders as "bystanders," see generally Richard M.
Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73 CAL. L.
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NIRMA, Ltd. v. Parker21' made it clear that not only were
shareholders in general meetings excluded from making mana-
gerial decisions, but they did not even have the power to com-
municate their views and opinions on management matters to
the board.212 Furthermore, in one Australian case, LC O'Neil
Enterprises Pty, Ltd. v. Toxic Treatments, Ltd.,213 the court
severely restricted the circumstances in which shareholders
could themselves convene, and therefore have access, to the
general meeting.214
Many of the changes relating to general meetings under
Chapter 2G, schedule I of the Company Law Review Act
1998215 will facilitate greater shareholder involvement and
"voice" in corporate governance, and it has been suggested that
the reforms will accelerate shareholder activism in Austra-
lia.21 One important reform under the Act is that, under
section 249F, members holding at least 5% of votes in the
company will have an absolute right to convene a general
meeting directly.217 This reverses the previous restrictive
position taken by the court in LC O'Neil Enterprises Pty, Ltd.
v. Toxic Treatments, Ltd, where such a right could be ousted by
the company's constitution.21 Section 249F of the Act will im-
REV. 1671 (1985).
211. (1986) 4 AC.L.C. 609. In the United States, compare SEC Rule 14a-8,
which was regarded by the court in Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC,
432 F.2d 659, 680-81 (D.C. Cir. 1970), as critical in ensuring shareholder participa-
tion in matters concerning their investment, although the boundaries of sharehold-
er involvement have been shifting as a result of fluctuating interpretations of the
"ordinary business" exception to the shareholder proposal rule. See generally Daniel
E. Lazaroff, Promoting Corporate Democracy and Social Responsibility: The Need to
Reform the Federal Proxy Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 33
(1997); Michelle J. McCann, Shareholder Proposal Rule: Cracker Barrel in Light of
Texaco, 39 B.C. L. REV. 965, 973 (1998); Beth-ann Roth, Proactive Corporate-Share-
holder Relations: Filling the Communications Void, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 101
(1998).
212. (1986) 4 A.C.L.C. 609, 614.
213. (1986) 4 A.C.L.C. 178.
214. See id. at 180.
215. The Company Law Review Act, 1998, (Austl.), commenced on July 1, 1998.
All amendments in the Act are now consolidated in the Corporations Law, (Austl.).
Further proposals to increase effective shareholder participation in corporate gover-
nance via greater use of "virtual meeting" technology are found in the recent re-
port of the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, supra note 14.
216. See James MacDonald, Major Reform of Company Law Rules, 72 L. INST.
J. 54 (1988).
217. Company Law Review Act, 1998, § 249F (Austl.).
218. (1976) 4 A.C.L.C. 178.
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plement the policy behind Kirby P.'s dissenting judgment in
the LC O'Neil Enterprises decision, that the right of sharehold-
ers to convene a general meeting should be a "fail-safe" protec-
tion granted to members, to enable them to act swiftly and
independently of the directors.219
Sections 250S and 250T, schedule 1 of the Company Law
Review Act 1998" ° may increase shareholder involvement at
annual general meetings. Section 250S requires the chairper-
son of an annual general meeting to allow the members as a
whole a reasonable opportunity to ask questions or make com-
ments on the management of the company. 1 This is in con-
trast to .NRMA, Ltd. v. Parker, which took the view that this
was outside the role and function of shareholders.222 Section
250T gives a similar statutory right to shareholders to ques-
tion the company's auditor, or the auditor's representative, if
present at the annual general meeting.21
These provisions have caused a considerable amount of
angst in Australian boardrooms, with concerns that the annual
general meetings of Australian companies will in the future be
disrupted by small numbers of vocal shareholders. 224 None-
theless, sections 250S and 250T are relatively tame. Although
there is a right for members to ask questions, there is no corre-
sponding duty for the directors or auditor to answer ques-
tions.2  In the case of section 250T, the right is conditional
on the presence of the auditor or representative at the meet-
ing, and such presence is not mandatory.2 6 The language of
sections 250S and 250T, particularly the references to "a rea-
sonable opportunity 22 and "the members as a whole, "2H is
219. Id. at 180.
220. Company Law Review Act, 1998, §§ 250S, 250T (Austl.).
221. Id. § 250S.
222. (1986) 4 A.C.L.C. 609.
223. Company Law Review Act, 1998, § 250T (Austl.).
224. For a fascinating account of genuine problems in this regard in Japan,
where for some time professional agitators, "the Sokaiya," were so disruptive at
annual general meetings that they were paid by management not to attend, see
JONATHAN P. CHARKHAM, KEEPING GOOD COMPANY: A STUDY OF CORPORATE GOV-
ERNANCE IN FIVE COUNTRIES 79 (1994).
225. See Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities, Report
on the Draft Second Corporate Law Simplification Bill 1996, para. 2.54.
226. Compare Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities,
supra note 225, at recommendation 5(a), with Government Response to the Report
of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities on the Draft
Second Corporate Law Simplification Bill (1997), at 9.
227. Company Law Review Act, 1998, §§ 250S, 250T (Austl.).
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vague and ambiguous. The chairperson of meetings will still
have significant discretion in the way that the meetings are
conducted and will certainly not need to ensure that each
member who wishes to speak has an opportunity to do so. 2
The proposed introduction of a statutory derivative action
under the CLERP Bill is also designed to enhance managerial
accountability, by enabling an individual shareholder to bring
private actions for breach of directors' duties.Y° Since duty-
based controls on managerial misconduct, such as fiduciary
duties, depend upon judicial monitoring to ensure compli-
ance,2 1 standing to sue is an important issue. One of the
goals of the statutory derivative suit is to abolish the famously
restrictive rule in Foss v. Harbottle, 2 under which the com-
pany is prima facie the proper plaintiff in an action for breach
of duty by directors. 3 At general law, an individual member
would not have standing to sue, unless able to satisfy the
stringent requirements for a derivative action. 4
In the past, these restrictions on standing could be by-
passed in Australia under section 1324 of the Corporations
Law, which allows any "person whose interests have been, are
or would be affected by" conduct contravening the Corporations
Law to apply for injunctive relief and damages." 5 Nonethe-
less, a number of recent cases have interpreted section 1324
itself in a very narrow way, to prevent it undermining the rule
in Foss v. Harbottle 6
The introduction of a statutory derivative action in Austra-
228. See id.
229. See Company Law Review Bill, 1997, Explanatory Memorandum, supra
note 206, para. 10.78.
230. See CLERP Bill, supra note 9, pt. 2F.1A, sched. 1.
231. See PARKINSON, supra note 134, at 73-74.
232. 2 Hare 461 (1843) (Eng.). For a comparative discussion of Anglo-Australian
and U.S. law in this area, see Deborah A. DeMott, Shareholder Litigation in Aus-
tralia and the United States: Common Problems, Uncommon Solutions, 11. SYD. L.
REv. 259 (1987).
233. Foss, 2 Hare 461 (1843) (Eng.).
234. The two preconditions to establishing a derivative action at general law
are that the wrongdoers' actions constitute a fraud on the minority and that the
wrongdoers are in control. See FORD ET AL., supra note 28, para. 11.270.
235. See Robert Baxt, Will Section 574 of the Companies Code Please Stand
Up! (And Will Section 1323 of the Corporations Act Follow Suit), 7 COMPANY &
SEC. L.J. 388 (1989).
236. See, e.g., Mesenberg v. Cord Indus. Recruiters Pty, Ltd. (1996) 19 A.C.S.R.
483, 488-89.
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lia under the CLERP Bill 7 will implement the recommenda-
tions of a number of reports in Australia over the last decade
that have advocated the enactment of a statutory derivative
action.S These reports have generally supported the intro-
duction of a statutory derivation action on the basis that cur-
rent standing rules unduly inhibit shareholders in commencing
legal proceedings on behalf of the company and thereby acting
as an independent regulatory mechanism."
Central elements of the proposed statutory derivative
action are as follows. First, a range of persons associated with
the company may apply for leave to bring proceedings on be-
half of the company." Eligible persons include a member or
former member of the company or a related body corporate,
and past and present directors and officers of the company.24'
Excluded from the list of persons is the Australian Securities
and Investments Commission (ASIC).242 According to the Ex-
planato7y Memorandum, this is deliberate, since the action is
designed as a self-help measure for investors, with "the poten-
tial to remove some of the regulatory burden from ASIC by
making it easier for investors themselves to protect the inter-
ests of a company."24
Second, the court acts as a filter in the process, determin-
ing, at the time when an application is made, whether or not
the action should proceed. The court must, however, grant the
237. See CLERP Bill, supra note 9, pt. 2F.1A, sched. 1.
238. See COMPANY AND SECURITIES LAW REVIEW COMITTEE, ENFORCEMENT OF
THE DUTIES OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF A COMPANY BY MEANS OF A STATUTO-
RY DERIVATIVE ACTION, REPORT No. 12 (1990); Report of the House of Representa-
tives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Corporate Practices
and the Rights of Shareholders, Recommendation 26 (1991); Companies and Securi-
ties Advisory Committee, Report'on a Statutory Derivative Action (1993). The Par-
liamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities has recently added its
support for the introduction of the proposed statutory derivative action, on the
basis that it will clarify and add certainty to the law. Parliamentary Joint Com-
mittee on Corporations and Securities, supra note 21, para. 2.11.
239. See CLERP Bill Explanatory Memo, supra note 126, at 19. The Australian
Stock Exchange, however, raised objections that the proposed form of the statutory
derivative suit could lead to vexatious actions. See Parliamentary Joint Committee
on Corporations and Securities, supra note 21, para. 2.9.
240. See CLERP Bill, supra note 9, § 236, sched. 1.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. CLERP Bill Explanatory Memo, supra note 126, at 21. The concept of pri-
vate litigation as an independent mechanism to ensure compliance with the law
has long been accepted in the United States. See DeMott, supra note 232, at 283.
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application, if it is satisfied of certain statutory criteria.'
Third, one of the central problems with the common law deriv-
ative suit was the fact that no action could generally be taken
with respect to a breach of duty that was ratifiable by the
general meeting.24 This was exacerbated by the fact that the
courts have, in recent years, characterized a wider range of
breaches of duty as ratifiable." s Under the proposed reform,
however, the court will have greater discretion where there has
been general meeting ratification. While ratification will not
prevent the bringing of a statutory derivative action, the court
may nonetheless take the ratification (including the extent to
which ratifying members were well-informed about the rele-
vant conduct and were acting for proper purposes) into account
in its determination.247 Finally, and perhaps most important-
ly, the court has broad discretion concerning costs in relation
to proceedings brought under a statutory derivative action, and
can make "any orders it considers appropriate."24" Where the
court considers proceedings to be in the company's best inter-
ests, it will therefore be possible for the court to indemnify an
applicant shareholder from company funds.
In contiast to these developments, there are a number of
reforms under the Company Law Review Act 1998, which con-
fer greater discretion and flexibility on directors in relation to
a range of share capital transactions. For example, in the case
of capital reductions; court approval will no longer be neces-
sary.249 Also, under the revised provisions dealing with a
company providing financial assistance for the purchase of its
244. Under section 237(2), the criteria are that: (a) it is probable that the com-
pany will not itself bring the action; (b) the applicant is acting in good faith; (c)
the action is in the best interests of the company; (d) there is a serious question
to be tried; (e) the applicant gave at least 14 days written notice to the company
of the intention to apply for leave and reasons for so doing or it is appropriate for
the court to grant leave even though the notice requirement has not been satis-
fied. See CLERP Bill, supra note 9, § 237(2), sched. 1.
245. See FORD ET AL., supra note 28, para. 11.270.
246. See, e.g., Winthrop Invs., Ltd. v. Winns, Ltd. 11975] N.S.W.L.R. 666. Com-
pare, however, Residues Treatment & Trading Co. v. Southern Resources, Ltd. (No.
4) (1988) 6 A.C.L.C. 1160.
247. See CLERP Bill, supra note 9, § 239, sched. 1. The court also has very
broad discretionary powers under section 241; including the power to appoint an
independent person to report on the affairs of the company. Id. § 241, sched. 1.
248. Id. § 242, sched. 1.
249. See Company Law Review Act, 1998, § 256B(1), sched. 5 (Austl.).
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own shares, the need for shareholder consent as a monitoring
and legitimating technique is significantly reduced."' Direc-
tors will, under the new provisions, generally have greater
autonomy in implementing corporate restructurings, so long as
the transactions do not materially prejudice the company and
its ability to pay creditors." 1
IX. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN AUSTRALIA
Australia is currently experiencing two major trends,
which have reshaped shareownership. The most recent of these
trends is a jump in the number of individual Australians hold-
ing shares, as a result of a series of major privatizations and
demutualizations in recent times. 2 Recent figures show
that, following the partial float of Telstra"3 in November
1997, share ownership in Australia surged to 40.4% of adults,
with 28.5% of all adult Australians having direct share owner-
ship. 4 Over 1.8 million Australians, of which 559,000 were
first time shareowners, invested in the Telstra float, compris-
ing 4.3 billion shares.25
The second trend relates to the dramatic rise in institu-
tional investment. 6 It has been estimated, for example, that
institutional investors now hold approximately 65% of avail-
able capital of companies listed in Australia. 7 There is no
doubt that institutional investors in Australia have the poten-
tial to play an important role in corporate governance, as a
self-regulatory mechanism.s 8 Just as the proposed statutory
250. See Company Law Review Bill, 1997, Explanatory Memorandum, supra
note 206, para. 12.75 to 12.76; Corporations Law, pt. 2J.3 (Austl.).
251. See Company Law Review Act, 1998, pt. 2J.1, sched. 5 (Austl.).
252. See ASX 1998 Shareownership Update (visited Nov. 10, 1999)
<http/Iwww.asx.com.au>.
253. The Australian Senate has recently decided to sell another 16.6% tranche
of Telstra. See Selling Telstra Benefits Users, AUSTRALIAN BUS. INTELLIGENCE, July
6, 1999, at 63; Richard Alston & John Fahey, Passage of Telstra Legislation, ME-
DIA RELEASE, July 8, 1999.
254. See Alston & Fahey, supra note 253.
255. See id.
256. See generally IAN M. RAMSAY ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS' VIEWS ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1998); G. P. STAPLEDON, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1996); Jennifer Hill, Institutional Investors and
Corporate Governance in Australia, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, at 583.
257. See AIMA, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A GUIDE FOR INVESTMENT MANAGERS
AND CORPORATIONS 13 (2d ed., July 1997).
258. Nonetheless, there exist some obstacles to institutional investors adopting
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derivative action is designed to encourage private enforcement
of directors' duties, so institutional investors are seen as poten-
tial monitors."
So far institutional investor involvement has primarily
manifested itself in two distinct ways. The first of these has
involved institutional investor pressure at a procedural level.
The leading institutional investor group, IFSA, publishes an
influential guide of recommended corporate practice.26 The
principles of good corporate governance contained in the guide
are very detailed, relating to matters such as composition of
boards, appointment of non-executive directors, board commit-
tees and performance evaluation.
Institutional investors have also lobbied strongly for cer-
tain legislative changes. Recently, they lobbied for the intro-
duction of more rigorous disclosure standards for director and
executive remuneration in publicly listed companies, on the
basis that the existing provisions were "incomplete, piecemeal
and unclear in their reach."26 Additionally, they contended
that the Australian disclosure regime lagged far behind re-
quirements in a number of other countries and international
statements of best practice.262 The reforms sought by the in-
stitutional investors were included at the eleventh hour when
the Company Law Review Act was passed in the Senate.6 '
The second way in which Australian institutional investors
have affected corporate governance has been through activism.
Institutional investors have been instrumental in a number of
boardroom coups in Australia," in which the institutions
were by no means universally applauded for their stance.265
this role. See G. P. Stapledon, Disincentives to Activism by Institutional Investors
in Listed Australian Companies, 18 SYDNEY L. REV. 152 (1996). In the U.K. con-
text, see Holland, supra note 4, at 127.
259. See RAMSAY ET AL., supra note 256.
260. See IFSA Guidance Note No. 2.00, supra note 11.
261. Jennifer Hill, "What Reward Have Ye?" Disclosure of Director and Execu-
tive Remuneration in Australia, 14 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 232, 232 (1996).
262. See id.
263. Company Law Review Act, 1998, § 300A (Austl.). See Hans Van Leeuwen,
Corporate Crackdown: Executives Forced to Reveal Their Salaries, AUSTL. FIN.
REV., June 26, 1998, at 1.
264. Two notable examples related to the companies, Goodman Fielder and
Coles Myer. See generally Jennifer Hill, supra note 205, at 202.
265. In the controversial Coles Myer dispute, the Prime Minister at the time,
Paul Keating, entered the fray, referring to the institutional investors as "don-
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Although the institutions have often cited governance issues as
a key reason for their interference, it is generally recognized
that financial underperformance is the real trigger in most
cases.
266
The most recent high-profile example of activism has been
at BHP Ltd., a blue-chip corporate icon in Australia,267 in
which institutions own more than 60% of all shares. In March
1998, BBP's chief executive, John Prescott was forced to re-
sign, following pressure from institutional investors and non-
executive directors. 2' The company clearly fell within the
category of underperformance. BHP announced a full-year net
loss of $1.47 billion and asset writedowns of more than $3
billion, in the wake of lower commodity prices, the Asian eco-
nomic downturn,269 and a series of disastrous acquisitions
and investment projects undertaken by the company.270
Anecdotal evidence suggests that institutional investors
are clearly playing a greater role, not only in the removal of
CEOs, but also in the appointment process.2 ' Echoing John
Pound's model of shared governance by institutional investors
and the board,72 one fund manager was reported as saying
keys." See Shires, PM Blasts "Donkey" Funds Managers: The Coles Myer Affair,
AUSTL. FIN. REV., Oct. 20, 1995, at 14.
266. See Crispin Wood, Corporate Australia: Who's in Charge?, BUS. REV.
WEEKLY, June 1, 1998, at 62; KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, BOARD MEETING IN
SESSION: BOARDS OF DIRECTORS IN AUSTRALASIA 1997 19-20 (1997).
267. The 113 year old company goes under the sobriquet, "The Big Australian."
268. See Ivor Ries, Behind Prescott's Early Exit, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Mar. 8,
1998, at 48. John Prescott subsequently received a golden handshake of $11.1
million. See John Hurst & Christine Lacy, BHP Execs Get Pay Rise as Prescott
Gets Paid Out, AUSTL. FIN. REv., Aug. 22, 1998, at 11.
269. See Kate Askew, BHP Down... And Still Out, SYDNEY MORNING HER-
ALD, June 27, 1998, at 93.
270. See Glenn Burge, Growth Binge Delivers Failure, SYDNEY MORNING HER-
ALD, June 27, 1998, at 93; Kate Askew, Magma Copper Flows $1.78bn Into The
Red, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, June 27, 1998, at 94; Trevor Sykes, BHP's Top-
heavy Troubles, AUSTL. FIN. REV., June 27, 1998, at 56. According to one commen-
tator, "BHP has become the first industrial company in Australian history to have
blown more than $5 billion of shareholder funds in less than a decade." Ivor Ries,
BHP: Jerry Ellis's Last Stand, Ausm. FIN. REV., June 30, 1998, at 52. Following
these financial revelations, a number of large and small BHP shareholders en-
gaged in a new round of activism, successfully putting pressure on Ellis to leave
the position of company chairman early. See Ian Howard & Christine Lacy, In-
vestors Demand Ellis's Head, AUSTL. FIN. REV., June 30, 1998, at 1.
271. See Wood, supra note 266, at 62.
272. See John Pound, The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance
and Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003 (1993); John Pound, The Promise
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that it is common for the board to consult with institutions
about "what qualities shareholders want to see in the new
managing director."273 BH-P spent seven months seeking a re-
placement for its former CEO, during which time there was
overt tension between the board of directors274 and institu-
tional investors, who demanded an outside appointment.
27 5
BHP initially responded to institutional investor pressure by
announcing that the selection of the new CEO would be made
by a board committee with a majority of non-executive direc-
tors, who, according to one commentator, were "outside the
club."276 Ultimately, in spite of strong suggestions that BHP's
management and board favored an internal appointment, the
company announced that an American, who was currently
president and CEO of Duke Energy Corp, would become BHP's
next chief executive officer. 77
X. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE AUSTRALIAN STOCK
EXCHANGE
The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) has assumed a more
prominent role in corporate regulation. Senator Gibson, for
example, has stated that:
In Australia, we have.., a regulatory framework, whereby
the regulator has developed an effective partnership with the
Stock Exchange. The importance of self-regulatory
organisations should not be underestimated. A self-regulatory
of the Governed Corporation, HARv. Bus. REv., Jan-Feb. 1995, at 89.
273. Wood, supra note 266, at 62.
274. See Alan Kohler, Alarm Over BHP's Top Job, AUSTL. FIN. REV., May 2,
1998, at 60; Stephen Bartholomeusz, Who Can Lead BHP Out Of The Mire?, AGE,
May 16, 1998, at 1.
275. See Alan Kohler, Yanking BHP Into Global Practice, AUSTL. FIN. REV.,
May 19, 1998, at 21; Kate Askew, Nasser Touted As Head For BHP, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, May 26, 1998, at 25. See also Alan Kohler, Alarm Over BHPs
Top Job, AUSTL. FIN. REV., May 2, 1998, at 60, who states, "twlell, here is a news
flash: revolution is coming to BHP whether they like it or not. If an internal
candidate gets the job and the board tries to get by with only incremental change,
then the stockmarket will savage the company."
276. Elisabeth Sexton, Responsibility And Accountability Are Now The Bywords,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, June 27, 1998, at 93.
277. See Alan Kohler, Smorgon Steeled For BHP, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Oct. 10,
1998, at 64; BHP Reportedly Pressured By Institutional Investors To Name New
CEO, AFX NEWS: WORLD REPORTER, Oct. 27, 1998; Australia's BHP Taps Duke
Energy Official To Become Its CEO, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 1998, at B16.
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organisation has the ability to impose rules for market con-
duct which are acceptable to market participants. 8
ASX Listing Rules are a potent source of regulation, since
listed companies are obliged by the Corporations Law to com-
ply with the rules and the obligation can be enforced by the
courts.279 Nonetheless, there are indications that the ASX,
which recently demutualized and listed its own shares on its
Exchange on October 14, 1998, will adopt a far less prescrip-
tive and interventionist approach to matters of corporate gov-
ernance than has, for example, the London Stock Exchange in
recent years. In its submission to a Senate Commission inquiry
on the Company Law Review Bill 1997, the ASX strongly op-
posed a prescriptive and interventionist approach to corporate
governance, on the basis that it was impossible to devise gover-
nance standards appropriate for the whole corporate spectrum
and that any attempt to do so would interfere with the ability
of Australian companies to follow world best practice. 8 '
There has been a clear tension between the ASX's ap-
proach and that of IFSA, which has favored a more detailed
and prescriptive approach to corporate governance matters.28'
Listing Rule 4.10.3, which came into operation on June 30,
1996 and requires listed companies to disclose their main cor-
porate governance practices in annual reports,282 provides a
good example of this tension.
In 1994, the ASX announced that it wished to take "a
leadership role" in promoting corporate governance standards
for listed companies.2" According to the ASX, there were two
main reasons justifying the introduction of rules relating to
corporate governance. First, investor confidence in Australian
278. Senator Gibson, Address at 15th East Asian & Oceanic Stock Exchange
Federation General Assembly (May 27, 1996). Compare, however, the admonition
of Earl Latham that the checks and balances operating to control corporate power
should not be "entrusted to the subjective bias of the hierarchies within." Earl
Latham, The Body Politic of the Corporation, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN
SOCIETY 218, 228 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1960).
279. Corporations Law, § 777 (Austl.).
280. See Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities, Report
on Company Law Review Bill, 1997, Mar. 1998, para. 1.35.
281. See id. para. 1.36.
282. See ASX Listing Rules, supra note 13, § 14.10.
283. See AUSTRALIAN STOCK EXCHANGE, DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE GOVER-
NANCE PRACTICES BY LISTED COMPANIES 1 (Sept. 1994).
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equity markets might be undermined unless companies were
seen to be adopting good corporate governance principles.2"
Second, a number of international stock exchanges had intro-
duced, or proposed to introduce, rules which gave guidance on
appropriate standards of corporate governance, requiring com-
panies to disclose whether they met those standards."5
There was an earlier attempt to formulate principles of
good governance for companies in 1991, when a Working
Group, with representatives from the ASX and a number of
private sector organizations, released a guide on Corporate
Practices and Conduct."' The Guide proposed that
companies' annual reports should contain a statement support-
ing the governance principles set out in the Guide and explain
departures from the principles.8 7 According to the ASX, how-
ever, this Guide had been less than successful, with evidence
suggesting that a large proportion of listed companies did not
follow the principles or make any reference to them in their
annual reports."
The introduction in 1996 of the new listing rule was wide-
ly heralded as a major advance in corporate governance prac-
tices. Yet, in fact the final version8 9 of ASX Listing Rule
4.10.3 was relatively innocuous, avoiding any prescriptive rules
as to the appropriate content of corporate governance practices.
This followed strong opposition in the business community to
the original proposal to introduce a checklist of best corporate
governance practices, together with a requirement that compa-
nies explain any deviation from this list. Therefore, under the
284. See id.
285. Exchanges which were regarded as particularly influential in this regard
were the London Stock Exchange, Toronto Stock Exchange and New York Stock
Exchange. See id. at 6-8.
286. Working Group on Corporate Practices and Conduct, Corporate Practices
and Conduct (Information Australia, 1991) (the Bosch Committee Report).
287. See id.
288. See AUSTRALIAN STOCK EXCHANGE. supra note 283, at 6.
289. This is less stringent than an earlier proposal that the ASX should adopt
a listing rule, similar to that of the London Stock Exchange, which would have
required listed companies to include in their annual reports:
[A] statement as to whether the company has followed throughout the
reporting period the practices set out in the Schedule of the Corporate
Governance Practices. A company that has not followed all of the practic-
es . . . must identify those practices not followed and give reasons for
not following them.
Id. at 2.
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final version of ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3, "[n]o benchmark lev-
els are set, there are no areas of compulsory disclosure, and
there is no minimum level of disclosure." 90 Rather, compli-
ance simply requires that companies disclose their main corpo-
rate governance practices, if any.
An indicative, rather than prescriptive, list of corpoiate
governance matters that a company may take into account in
preparing its statement of practices is found in Appendix 4A to
the Listing Rules. Relevant factors covered in Appendix 4A
include matters such as board composition and review; ap-
pointment and retirement of non-executive directors; indepen-
dent advice for directors; remuneration practices; audit ar-
rangements; business risk strategies; and ethical standards.
There has been controversy about the effectiveness of the
operation of ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3.291 While the ASX con-
sidered that there had been total compliance with the new
governance rule, IEFSA took a less sanguine view, suggesting
that the governance statements of only a small percentage
(10%) of the Top 100 companies reviewed provided useful infor-
mation and demonstrated an understanding of the rationale
and purpose of the statement.292 Other reports on the opera-
tion of the new disclosure rule have concluded that, although
there is scope for considerable improvement in disclosure of
corporate governance practices, Listing Rule 4.10.3 has encour-
aged many companies, particularly larger companies, to make
detailed disclosure of governance practicesY
290. IAN M. RAMSAY & RICHARD HOAD, DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE GOVER-
NANCE PRACTICES BY AUSTRALIAN COMPANIES 5 (1997).
291. See Ian M. Ramsay, Models of Corporate Regulation: the Mandato-
rylEnabling Debate, in CORPORATE PERSONALITY IN THE 20TH CENTURY, iupra note
205, at 215, 247-49.
292. See ALMA, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STATEMENTS BY MAJOR ASX LISTED
COMPANIES (Mar. 1997).
293. See Ian M. Ramsay & Richard Hoad, Disclosure of Corporate Governance
Practices by Australian Companies, 15 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 454 (1997); Disclo-
sures! Corporate Governance in Practice, COMPANY DIRECTOR, Mar. 1998, at 11. See
also G. P. STAPLEDON & JEFFREY LAWRENCE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE TOP
100: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE TOP 100 COMPANIES' BOARDS OF DIRECTORS
(1996). In a 1998 study of disclosure of corporate governance in the Top 100 com-
panies by IFSA, it was suggested that in spite of general improvements, "too
many companies are still treating disclosure as a compliance task rather than an
opportunity to communicate with shareholders in a meaningful way." IFSA Media
Release, Sept. 3, 1998.
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XI. OTHER COMMERCIAL CONSTRAINTS ON MANAGEMENT:
PERFORMANCE-BASED REMUNERATION AND TAKEOVERS
One commercial development that is particularly worthy of
note is performance-based pay for executives and directors.
Even more than institutional investor activism, this practice
can guarantee that managers pay undivided attention to the
goal of profit maximization for shareholders. It is no surprise
that in both the U.S. and Australia institutional investors have
agitated strongly for performance-based pay. 94
Pay for performance comes in many guises, and essentially
ties a substantial portion of executive remuneration to corpo-
rate performance. This trend has been widely hailed as a gov-
ernance technique in itself, which can ensure accountability of
directors and managers by aligning their interests with those
of shareholders. Ever since Jensen and Murphy made their
famous pronouncement, "CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much
You Pay, But How,"29 pay for performance schemes have
flourishedY
In Australia, performance-based pay is now a major trend
both in the private sector and in the public service." 7 A re-
cent survey on pay for performance"8 has shown that there
has been a significant increase in executive option plans ap-
proved in Australia.299 Performance hurdles were included in
90% of these executive option plans."0 In spite of the general
enthusiasm for performance-based pay, not everyone regards it
294. See Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and
Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1889-90 (1992) (book review).
295. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How
Much You Pay, But How, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1990, at 138.
296. In the U.K., the Greenbury Committee, reporting in 1995, thought that
performance-related remuneration was very effective in aligning shareholder and
management interests. See Directors' Remuneration, Report of a Study Group
chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury, July 1995, para. 6.16.
297. So successful has the concept of performance-related pay been in the pub-
lic sector, that it seems that even bureaucrats are no longer paid like bureaucrats.
See Clare, Pay Reforms and the Performance Culture in the Public Sector, 78 CAN-
BERRA BULL. PUB. ADMIN. 82 (1995).
298. Equity Strategies Report, Pay for Performance-1997 Executive Share
Plans: Australia Top 150 Companies, New Zealand Top 14 Companies (June 1998).
299. The survey sample comprised 122 companies out of Australia's top 150
companies by market capitalization. See id. In 1997, executive option plans had
been approved in 43% of the sample companies, in contrast to 17% in 1996. See
id.
300. See id. at 2.
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as a panacea to corporate governance problems.0 1 For exam-
ple, it can be argued that alignment of shareholder and man-
agement interests is not all that counts in governance. A num-
ber of scholars assert that the fundamental objectives of corpo-
rate governance systems must be the long-term health of the
corporate enterprise and that to achieve this, corporate law
needs to seek to align, not just the interests of managers and
shareholders, but also the interests of a range of other groups,
such as employees, suppliers and creditors." 2
Performance-based pay therefore has the capacity to privi-
lege shareholder interests at the expense of other groups in the
company.3 3 At a commercial level, it has effectively "collec-
tivized" the interests of shareholders and managers, at a time
when there has been a shift in Australia toward
"decollectivization" of labor interests through enterprise bar-
gaining systems.3 Pay for performance can present dangers
to employees and indeed the long-term interests of the enter-
prise itself. As one Australian commentator has stated "Insti-
tutional investors-themselves under pressure to perform-are
obsessed with maintaining growth of 15 per cent per annum.
When GDP is growing by 3% and consumer prices by about
half that rate, the only way to achieve 10 per cent plus profit
growth is by taking out costs."0 ' Also, pay for performance,
designed as a governance technique, can itself, particularly
301. See generally Hill, supra note 171, at 21, 33-36.
302. See, e.g., BLAIR, supra note 5, at 202-34; Martin Lipton et al., Book Re.
view: Corporate Governance in the Era of Institutional Ownership, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1144, 1153 (1995).
303. See generally Hill, supra note 205, at 193-95.
304. See Ron McCallum, Crafting a New Collective Labour Law for Australia,
39 J. IND. REL. 405 (1997); Jennifer Hill, At the Frontiers of Labour Law and
Corporate Law: Enterprise Bargaining, Corporations and Employees, 23 FED. L.
REv. 204 (1995). In the U.S. context, Professor Gordon has noted that while corpo-
rate profits increased by 250% between 1980 and 1995, the average wages for all
workers, except those in the top quintile of wage distribution, declined in real
terms, creating "circumstances in which shareholders are gaining and workers are
not." Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97
COLUIm. L. REV. 1519, 1534 (1997).
305. Kohler, supra note 275, at 21. For some of the dangers of this increasing
focus on "economic competitiveness and bottom line returns," see Eric W. Orts,
The Future of Enterprise Organization, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1947, 1966 (1998). Also,
in the leaner 1990s, costs are not always the root cause of poor performance. See,
e.g., Joann S. Lublin & Martha Brannigan, Sunbeam Names Albert Dunlap As
Chief Betting He Can Pull Off a Turnaround, WALL ST. J., July 19, 1996, at B2;
Exit Bad Guy, ECONOMIST, June 20-26, 1998, at 70.
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when coupled with stock options, create a range of new gover-
nance problems, including dangers in relation to timing of
disclosure of corporate information, where exercise of options is
linked to share price.0 6
A fundamental and fascinating question in the remunera-
tion debate in corporate governance is whether there is a caus-
al link between pay structures and firm performance. Recent
special reports in the United States by Business Week" 7 sug-
gest that the connection is tenuous at best in practice. °8 The
1999 report also revealed that, largely as a result of pay for
performance, the average American CEO, whose pay has in-
creased 442% from its 1990 level, now earns 419 times the
wage of an average blue-collar worker.0 9
A final reform proposal, designed to improve managerial
accountability, involves radical changes to Australia's takeover
regime, which will be rewritten under the CLERP Bill."0
Mirroring international trends, there has been a marked de-
cline in takeovers in Australia in the 1990s." 1l The stated
aim of the proposed reforms to the takeover regulation is to
306. See Joshua A. Kreinberg, Note, Reaching Beyond Performance Compensa-
tion in Attempts to Own the Corporate Executive, 45 DUKE L.J. 138 (1995); Hill,
supra note 124.
307. See Compensation Scoreboard Glossary, Bus. WK., Apr. 19, 1999, at 90;
Special Report: Executive Pay, BUS. WK., Apr. 19, 1999, at 72; Special Report:
Executive Pay, BUS. WK, Apr. 20, 1998, at 2.
308. According to the 1998 Business Week:
Good, bad, or indifferent, virtually anyone who spent time in the corner
office of a large public company in 1997 saw his or her net worth rise by
at least several million. Thanks to an exploding stock market, CEOs
were more handsomely rewarded than ever before .... But for many
CEOs, those gains bore little relation to how well their companies-or
investors-did. In the pay-for-performance sweepstakes, the "performance"
half of the equation increasingly fell by the wayside.
Special Report: Executive Pay, BUS. WK., Apr. 20, 1998, supra note 307, at 2. See
also Fredrick Hilmer & Philip Stern, Hurdles Don't Test Executives, AUSTL. FIN.
REV., Aug. 5, 1998; Adam Bryant, Executive Cash Machine, N.Y. TIMEES, Nov. 8,
1998, at C1.
309. See Special Report: Executive Pay, Bus. WK., Apr. 19, 1999, supra note
307, at 72.
310. See generally BLACK ET AL., CLERP AND THE NEW CORPORATIONS LAW ch.
3 (1998).
311. See Jennifer Hill & Ian M. Ramsay, Institutional Investment in Australia:
Theory and Evidence, in SECURITIES REGULATION IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND
289, 295-96 (Walker & Fisse eds., 1994); John Green, Make Takeover Law Disci-
pline Managers, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Nov. 10, 1997, at 17.
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"facilitate a more competitive market for corporate control."312
The underlying premises to this change are that Australia's
current laws "unduly restrict takeover activity"1 and that
this is undesirable since the market for corporate control con-
stitutes a crucial monitoring device.1 4
Australia's takeover regime is founded on four key princi-
ples, known as the "Eggleston principles." Under these princi-
ples, it is necessary to ensure that shareholders:
*know the identity of the buyer;
-have sufficient time to assess the bid;
-have adequate information on all matters relevant to the
bid;
*have an equal opportunity to share in the benefits. 15
Current rules prima facie prohibit a bidder acquiring more
than 20% of a target's shares,316 unless it is via a permitted
acquisition method under the Corporations Law.317 This pro-
cess will often give rise to a contested auction. One highly
controversial reform proposal under the CLERP Bill, which
would, if accepted, modify this regulatory regime, is the "man-
datory bid" or "follow-on" rule.1 8 Under the proposed manda-
tory bid rule, a bidder will be able to proceed in an acquisition
over the 20% threshold, provided that immediately after the
acquisition occurs, an unconditional bid is made to other share-
holders at the highest price paid in the preceding four months
by the bidder for shares in the target company."' The effect
of the rule will be to enable bidders to acquire a controlling
stake in a company more easily and with greater certainty
312. CLERP Bill Explanatory Memo, supra note 126, at 36.
313. Green, supra note 311, at 17.
3i4. This has, however, become a controversial issue in recent years. Critics
have queried both the efficacy of takeovers and the efficient capital market hy-
pothesis. See generally Arthur R Pinto, Corporate Governance: Monitoring the
Board of Directors in American Corporations, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 317, 338 n.109
(1998). See also Prentice, supra note 6, at 25, 36-38.
315. These principles are currently reflected, for example, in Corporations Law,
§§ 732, 733 (Austl.).
316. See id. § 615.
317. Under the current regime, the Part A bid is the most important of the
permitted pathways for acquisitions over 20%. Other permitted pathways include:
on-market bids by takeover announcement on the ASX (Part C bid), and creeping
acquisitions of not more than 3% of shares every 6 months.
318. CLERP Bill, supra note 9, §§ 611, 614, sched. 1.
319. See id.
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through a pre-bid deal, than is possible under the current
regime. Under the proposed rule, control of a company may al-
ready have effectively passed to a bidder before the mandatory
bid is made.
The mandatory bid element preserves the "equality of
opportunity" principle under the Eggleston rules.32 Nonethe-
less, there has been concern that the ability of a bidder to by-
pass a contested auction under the mandatory bid rule may
prejudice other shareholders.321 Indeed, it has been suggested
that the effect of the mandatory bid rule will be to enable the
initial bidder "to storm, as it were, the commanding heights
over the 20% ceiling,""= which far from upholding the
reformist aim of facilitating a more competitive market for
corporate control, will actually subvert it." While the man-
datory bid rule assumes that minority shareholders are pro-
tected from receiving inadequate compensation by the self-
interest of the controlling and institutional investors in ex-
tracting an appropriate premium for their controlling block of
shares, this may not be the case where a vendor is forced to
sell a controlling parcel du-e to financial distress.3"
The takeover reforms will also reconstitute Australia's
takeover panel, the Corporations and Securities Panel,3" in
the image of the UK Panel on Takeovers and Mergers.3 26 It is
intended that the new-look Panel should become the primary
forum for resolving takeover disputes in Australia, rather than
the courts or Administrative Appeals Tribunal.3 27 The main
320. See, e.g., Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities,
supra note 21, para. 3.14.
321. See Frith, Costello Follow-On Folly a Regressive Takeover Reform, AUSTRA-
LIAN, Mar. 18, 1998, at 24.
322. BLACK ET AL., supra note 310, at 81.
323. See id. The government has undertaken to review the operation of the
mandatory bid rule two years after commencement, to ensure that its policy goals
are being met by the reform.
324. See id. at 80-81.
325. The Corporations and Securities Panel is created by Australian Securities
and Investments Commission Act, 1989, § 171 (Austl.).
326. For influential articles on the need for reform to rescue Australia's Corpo-
rations and Securities Panel from "dormancy," see Santow & Williams, Taking The
Legalism Out of Takeovers, 71 A.L.J. 749 (1997), and John M. Green & Stephen
Brent, Takeovers: Breathing More Life Into the Corporations and Securities Panel,
15 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 319 (1997).
327. See generally BLACK ET AL., supra note 310, at 109-20; Parliamentary
Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities, supra note 21, para. 3.52 to 3.55.
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goals of this reform are to ensure that takeover disputes are
resolved with greater speed, specialized expertise and infor-
mality, and to reduce the incidence of anti-takeover tactics."'
XII. CONCLUSION
It has been said that corporate governance involves the
interface between two competing cultural values-"dynamism
of enterprise and accountability under the law."329 The devel-
opments under contemporary Australian corporate law demon-
strate this tension well. They also indicate a new regulatory
eclecticism in corporate law,33 in which the possibility of dif-
ferent combinations and interactions of governance techniques
will continue to foster both diversity in organizational struc-
ture,331 and comparative study in the field of corporate gover-
nance.
POSTSCRIPT
The CLERP Bill was passed by the Senate of the Austra-
lian Federal Parliament on October 18, 1999 and by the House
of Representatives on October 20, 1999.332 It is expected that
the Bill will commence operation on March 13, 2000."'3
As a result of pressure by the Australian Democracts, who
hold the balance of power in the Senate, a number of changes
were made to the CLERP Bill at the last minute.334 The most
notable of these changes was removal of the mandatory bid
rule.33
5
328. For some doubts on the ability of the reforms to achieve these goals, see
Dyer, A Revitalised Panel?, 16 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 261 (1998).
329. Sealy, supra note 8, at 92, 93.
330. See Hill & Ramsay, supra note 311, at 289-90.
331. See Orts, supra note 305, at 1947.
332. See 23 BUTTERWORTHS CORPORATE LAW BULLETIN para. 370 (1999).
333. See id.
334. See id.; Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Bill 1998 Schedule of
Amendments made by the Senate (visited Nov. 10, 1999)
<http-J/www.aph.gov.au/parlinfo/billsnet/s-amend.htm>.
335. See BUTTERWORTHS CORPORATE LAW BULLETIN, supra note 332, para. 370;
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Bill 1998 Schedule of Amendments
made by the Senate, supra note 334.
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